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1 Summary 
We present a simulation analysis of the proposed Colombian firm energy market. The main 
purpose of the simulation is to assess the risk to suppliers of participation in the market. We also 
are able to consider variations in the market design, and assess the impact of alternative auction 
parameters.  
Three simulation models are developed and analyzed. The first model (Model 1) uses 
historical price data from October 1995 through May 2006 to assess the performance risk of 
hypothetical thermal and hydro generating units. The second model (Model 2) uses historical 
price and operating data to assess performance risk of the actual generating units in Colombia 
over the same period. This analysis allows us to assess company risk. The third model (Model 3) 
differs from the other models in that it explicitly models the firm energy auction and investments 
going forward. Thus, the model is able to assess how the distribution of firm energy purchases 
differs from the firm energy target, and how this distribution depends on the firm energy demand 
curve. Model 3 also studies the investment decisions of suppliers, the impact of lumpy 
investments, and the impact of a higher scarcity price. 
1.1 Model 1: Simulated units facing historical prices 
An important output of Model 1 is the distribution of net firm energy payments for the 
hypothetical hydro and thermal units. A resource selling firm energy is selling a hedge for energy 
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for prices above the scarcity price—whenever the spot energy price is above the scarcity price, 
the resource has an obligation to supply energy. The obligation is equivalent to a forward sale of 
energy at the scarcity price. Resources that over perform relative to the obligation are rewarded 
with the spot energy price for all extra output beyond their obligation; resources that under 
perform are penalized by effectively having to purchase the difference between the obligation 
and their output at the spot energy price. For taking on this obligation, resources receive a firm 
energy payment, which we assume here is equal to $12.85/MWh in January 2006 US dollars.3 
The net firm energy payment is the firm energy payment of $12.85 plus the reward for over 
performance, or minus the penalty for under performance. 
Our sample period includes one major dry period, which began August 1997 and ended 
April 1998. The dry period is characterized by frequent scarcity hours—hours in which the 
energy spot price is above the scarcity price of the hedge. There is a second, shorter period of 
high prices when the market first began, 20 November to 30 December 1995. 
In addition to the net firm energy payment, we calculate the Peak Energy Rent (PER). PER 
is the financial cost of the hedge—the difference between the spot price and the scarcity price for 
the obligation quantity in each scarcity hour. This cost is about 30 percent of the total firm 
energy payment. 
Model 1 determines the mean and standard deviation of the net firm energy payment for 
hypothetical generating units. We model performance risk for thermal units by assuming that the 
unit randomly fails and requires time to repair. Both the time until failure and the time to repair 
are exponentially distributed. The initial proposal for the market defined a unit’s obligation as its 
proportionate share of load in the hour. Thus, a unit selling 1% of the actual firm energy 
demanded has a 1% obligation in every scarcity hour. 
For our hypothetical thermal resource, we find that its net firm energy payment is roughly 
constant across all years. There is some variation in the net payment during the dry periods, but 
the variation is small relative to the mean. The variation is larger for resources with long repair 
times, since it is more likely that these units will either be running or not for extended periods. 
This increases risk. A second result is that the thermal units tend to under perform during dry 
periods. This is because they tend to produce at a constant rate, which results in a tendency to 
over perform during low-load hours and under perform during high-load hours. Since prices tend 
to be higher in high-load hours, this results in a slight penalty during the dry period. 
To better match a thermal unit’s output with its obligation, we consider a variation in which 
thermal resources have a constant obligation during scarcity hours and the hydro obligation 
follows the residual demand after subtracting the thermal obligation. We find that this variation 
does slightly increase a thermal resource’s mean return during dry periods, but it has almost no 
impact on risk. Nonetheless, the variation is desirable, since it improves the performance of the 
spot market in dry periods. A supplier has little incentive to exercise market power, since the 
supplier enters the spot market with a nearly balanced position. 
Performance risk of a hydro unit in Model 1 is modeled as a random draw of firm energy 
during dry periods. The hydro unit sells its expected firm energy during a dry period, but its 
actual firm energy may be more or less than is sold. Not surprisingly, the variation in the hydro 
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unit’s net firm energy payment is directly related to this variation in its actual firm energy. 
Another result is that a hydro unit tends to over perform during dry periods. This is because the 
hydro unit has limited water and it rationally uses this water in the highest-priced hours. As a 
result, the hydro unit tends to over perform during high-priced hours and under-perform during 
low-priced hours, and thus, it receives a reward on average.  
1.2 Model 2: Actual units facing historical prices and output decisions 
One limitation of Model 1 for evaluating risk is that it ignores the reality that suppliers 
typically own a portfolio of plants. Indeed suppliers often invest in portfolios of plants in part to 
reduce risk. In Model 2, we calculate the net firm energy payment for each existing generator, 
assuming the firm energy market was in place since October 1995. We use the unit’s actual 
output in each hour. Each unit sells the quantity of firm energy specified in the preliminary firm 
energy numbers. For hydro units we calculate the net firm energy payment for both the reference 
quantity and the maximum quantity. The net firm energy payment includes all profits for prices 
above the scarcity price. 
As was the case with our hypothetical units in Model 1, hydro units tend to over perform 
during dry periods and thermal units tend to under perform. However, because of the tendency 
for companies to hold diversified plant portfolios, the net firm energy payment is nearly constant 
across years for most companies.  
Model 2 demonstrates how the hedge reduces supplier risk. Suppliers forfeit peak energy 
rents during dry periods for a higher constant payment that is received in all years. This stabilizes 
profits across wet and dry periods, and thereby reduces risk. Suppliers face some performance 
risk, but this risk is reduced when the supplier owns a diversified portfolio of generating units, as 
is common. 
1.3 Model 3: Full simulation of investment decisions going forward 
Model 3 models the firm energy market going forward and thus the investment decisions of 
companies. There are two main inputs of Model 3. One is the set of existing resources and their 
preliminary firm energy numbers as updated in CREG resolution 071. The second is the 
hydrology output data for each of the hydro resources. We use each of the 100 ten-year series to 
simulate hydro output over 1000 years. We simulate the firm energy market over 1000 years 
(actually 50 twenty-year simulations) with benchmark parameter values. This analysis supports 
the risk analysis of Models 1 and 2. In addition, we are able to 1) determine how the distribution 
of firm energy purchases differs from the firm energy target, 2) determine the impact of lumpy 
investments, and 3) determine the impact of a higher scarcity price. We then consider two 
alternatives to the benchmark scenario. In the first alternative we double the slope of the firm 
energy demand curve. In the second alternative we double the price elasticity of demand during 
scarcity periods. 
There are a few differences between the model and the adopted resolution 071. We list them 
below, together with the likely impact of the difference. 
Obligation. Our model assumes the “thermal constant obligation,” which means during 
scarcity a thermal resource has an obligation equal to its long-run availability and hydro 
resources have an obligation equal to the residual demand after subtracting the thermal 
obligation. The adopted resolution assumes that the obligation follows dispatch for a quantity 
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over the day consistent with the unit’s firm energy sale. Given the bidding behavior in the 
simulation, units are dispatched consistent with the thermal constant obligation; thus, the 
difference has little or no impact on the calculations. 
Firm energy price in years of surplus. Our model assumes that the firm energy price in 
surplus years is read from the firm energy demand curve, which results in a drop of the firm 
energy price. In the adopted resolution, the firm energy price in surplus years is set equal to the 
price from the last successful auction. Load purchases the target quantity and the payment is 
allocated pro-rata among suppliers. The resolution reduces variation in the firm energy price; 
thus, it likely reduces risk in the firm energy payment. 
Length of commitment period for new entry. Our model assumes a ten-year commitment 
period for new entry; whereas, the adopted resolution has a commitment period of up to twenty 
years for new entry. Such a change would have a negligible impact on the simulation. The 
twenty-year commitment period further reduces variation in the firm energy payment for a new 
entrant. 
None of these differences between the model and the resolution alter the main findings of 
Model 3. These findings are as follows.  
• Lumpy investment means that few new units are added each year. Indeed, in 27% of the 
years no new entry occurs. (This is an overestimate to the extent that the size of winning 
projects reflect the actual need in the year.) In these years, the firm energy price is set by the 
firm energy demand curve, typically at a price that is significantly less than the prior-year 
price. As a result, the firm energy price fluctuates more than is desirable. As mentioned, the 
adopted resolution 071 addresses this problem. In a year of surplus, the firm energy price is 
set to the firm energy price from the last successful auction. 
• Lumpy investments cause a negative bias in profits, which bidders would need to take into 
account. Part of the bias is due to the low firm energy prices in surplus years—a bias which 
is eliminated in the adopted resolution. However, part of the bias will remain—the reduced 
energy rents as a result of surplus. 
• The mandatory hedge is remarkably successful in reducing risk. In the benchmark case, the 
hedge reduces aggregate profit risk by a factor of 7. More importantly, the hedge reduces 
company risk by a factor of 4.5 in the benchmark case. Even when we assume a high level of 
demand response so that prices remain low during scarcity periods and there is less profit risk 
to start with, the hedge reduces company risk by 55%. 
• A higher scarcity price increases risk. Increasing the scarcity price shifts the profit 
distribution toward the no hedge case (a scarcity price of infinity). This results in a large 
increase in energy rent risk and a small decrease in hedge payment risk. The overall impact is 
a large increase in profit risk. 
Taken together, the simulation results demonstrate the risk reducing benefits of the firm 
energy market. Provided there is competitive new entry in response to load growth, the firm 
energy market should work well at coordinating investment in new supply, while minimizing 




This paper presents a simulation analysis of the Colombia firm energy market. We assume 
that readers are familiar with the essential elements of the proposed firm energy market. As we 
write this, some details of the market are still under development. Our analysis is based on the 
description of the market presented in Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft, “Colombian Firm Energy 
Market,” White Paper, August 2006. 
The simulation analysis seeks to address several questions. For example, 
1. What is the supplier risk associated with performance incentives? 
2. What is the distribution of acquired firm energy relative to target firm energy in the 
auctions? 
3. What demand curve parameters target firm energy more accurately? 
The simulation model also allows us to consider variations in the market design. For 
example, in the proposal, the hourly obligation of both thermal and hydro resources follow load 
in the same way. We also consider a variation in which the obligation of the thermal resources is 
constant in all but the lowest-load hours, and the obligation of the hydro resources follows the 
residual demand after subtracting out the thermal obligation. This variation may reduce risk 
overall, since the thermal and hydro obligations more closely match the capability of each 
resource. This variation is especially relevant with respect to the question on supplier risk. 
Our analysis includes three different simulation models.  
1. Unit simulation. Simulation of a hypothetical thermal unit and a hypothetical hydro unit 
based on historical data. In this simulation, we assume that load’s purchase of firm 
energy in each year exactly equals yearly demand. We focus on the question of supplier 
risk. 
2. Historical estimation. Estimation of the net firm energy payment to all units based on 
the historical price, operation, and firm energy capability of the unit. Again we assume 
load’s purchase of firm energy in each year exactly equals yearly demand. The focus 
again is on supplier risk. 
3. Market simulation. A simulation of the market going forward. Here we assume that the 
purchase of firm energy is determined by market forces facing the demand curve in the 
proposal. Supplier’s expectations about future prices are roughly consistent with what 
occurs, which is called “rational expectations” in economics. 
Models 1 and 2 are intended to shed some light on the risk a supplier faces in the firm 
energy payment, as a result of performance incentives. For a thermal unit, this risk comes from 
random outages. For a hydro unit, the risk comes from variability in the amount of firm energy 
that the resource has in a particular dry period. Model 3 is intended to address longer-term issues, 
such as how the shape of the firm energy demand curve used in the auction impacts variation in 
the purchase of firm energy relative to the target.  
There are many questions outside the scope of this study. For example, we cannot assess the 
impact of the market on reliability. The firm-energy auction is designed to purchase a target level 
of firm energy and to see that it is dispatched efficiently; it is not intended to determine the firm 
energy target. This choice of course impacts reliability. We take the firm energy target as given. 
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3 Model 1: Simulation of hypothetical units with historical prices 
We begin with a simple simulation of a hypothetical thermal unit and a hypothetical hydro 
unit facing the history of prices from October 1995 through May 2006. The purpose is to assess 
supply risk from performance incentives. We model thermal and hydro units separately, since 
they face quite different performance risks. For thermal, the problem typically is random 
breakdowns, whereas for hydro units the problem is lack of water during a dry period. We 
assume that load’s purchase of firm energy exactly matches actual load. 
For both units, we calculate the firm energy payment net of performance incentives. Since 
the hypothetical units break-down or run out of water randomly, we simulate 1000 independent 
units of each type. This gives us a distribution of net firm energy payments from which we can 
calculate the mean, standard deviation, and other statistics both monthly and annually. All values 
are in January 2006 US$ per MWh of firm energy.  
Since in this section we are not modeling the auction itself, we simply assume an auction 
price equal to $12.85/MWh of firm energy. 
The sale of firm energy by a supplier includes a hedge for energy at a scarcity price. The 
scarcity price is a heat rate times a gas index plus other (non-fuel) variable costs. For other 
variable costs we use $15.20/MWh. The gas index is the New York Harbor residual fuel oil 
index, averaged over the prior month, and the heat rate is 12.482 MBTU/MWh.  
The quantity of the hedge varies by hour in our base case. In particular, the quantity follows 
hourly load. Each unit has an obligation in any hour that corresponds to its share of the firm 
energy sold. Thus, a unit that has sold 1% of all firm energy sold has an obligation equal to 1% 
of the actual load in each hour. Of course, no unit will exactly meet its obligation in every 
scarcity hour—an hour in which the spot price exceeds the scarcity price. When the unit over-
performs it is paid the spot energy price for every MWh of extra energy it delivers; when it 
under-performs it purchases at the spot energy price the extra energy needed to cover its 
obligation. Thus, in every hour in which the spot price is above the scarcity price there is either a 
reward or penalty based on the extent of over or under performance and the level of the spot 
price and the scarcity price.  
The net firm energy payment is defined as the firm energy payment of $12.85 plus the 
reward for over-performing minus the penalty for under-performing. We calculate the net firm 
energy payment on a monthly and annual basis. We also calculate the Peak Energy Rent (PER) 
on a monthly and annual basis. PER is the financial cost of the hedge—the difference between 
the spot price and the scarcity price for the obligation quantity in each scarcity hour. 
The base case described above is called the load-following case. We also consider a 
variation, called the thermal-constant case, in which the obligation for a thermal unit is equal to 
its average availability, unless load is so low that it is necessary for the thermal unit to follow 
load in the lowest-load hours. The hydro units in this case follow the residual demand, which is 
the hourly load less the obligation of the thermal units. 
The motivation for this variation is that the obligation more closely matches expected 
performance and hence reduces risk. The simulation determines the amount of this risk 
reduction. During a scarcity hour, all thermal units will want to be running regardless of load. 
Thermal units have limited capacity not limited firm energy. A thermal unit would never want to 
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miss a scarcity hour. In contrast, hydro units have limited firm energy. This implies a significant 
opportunity cost of running, which may well be above the scarcity price during a dry period. 
During a scarcity hour, the spot price is high because the opportunity cost of the marginal hydro 
unit is high. The thermal constant rule reflects the fact that thermal units want to run at full 
capacity during all scarcity hours. During scarcity hours, efficient dispatch will involve using the 
capacity of the thermal units first, and then the hydro capacity. 
We should emphasize that the load following rule does not in any way distort the actual 
dispatch, absent market power. Either rule leads to efficient dispatch. In both cases, the supplier 
desires to sell as much energy as it can whenever the spot price is above it marginal cost 
(including opportunity cost) and not to sell when price is lower. This is exactly the efficient 
incentive it would face without its obligation. Like any standard hedge, this one does not distort 
behavior. The different rules do, however, impact the expected net payment as well as its 
standard deviation for both the hydro and thermal resources. Determining these differences is 
one of the purposes of our first simulation. In addition, the different rules impact incentives to 
exercise market power. 
3.1 Modeling thermal units 
Thermal units on occasion break down and require repair. We assume long-run availability 
of either 95% or 70%, a constant repair probability per unit time (“exponential time to repair”), 
and a constant probability of outage.4 The mean time to repair is assumed to be either 10 hours or 
40 hours. A thermal unit sells its long-run availability as firm energy (e.g., 95% of a 1 GW unit = 
950 MW). We assume load purchases the actual annual energy demand as firm energy (the sum 
of load over all hours in year). We calculate average load/hr by dividing by the number of hours 
(getting something like 5541 MW in 2005). A supplier’s share for a unit with 950 MW average 
availability is 950/5541 = 17.1%. This is used to determine its obligation in each scarcity hour. 
The performance reward/penalty is added to this amount.  
The “exponential” model of failure and repair, assumes that failure (or repair) is just as 
likely right after a repair (or failure) as at any subsequent time. This is the most standard model 
of reliability and has substantial empirical support. If f is the mean time to failure and r is the 
mean time to repair, then p = f/(f + r) is the long-run availability of the unit. We use this 
relationship to determine mean time to fail from our assumptions on p and r. For example, 
p = 95% and r = 40 hours, the mean time to failure, f, equals r p/(1– p), or 760 hours. As the 
repair time increases, autocorrelation in availability increases; that is, a resource that is available 
in hour h is more likely to be available in hour h+1, and a resource that is unavailable in hour h is 
more likely to be unavailable in hour h+1. The motivation for this analysis is that real thermal 
generators not only fail, but also have significant repair times. 
The final parameter of the model is the marginal cost of the thermal resource. In this model 
we are focusing on prices above the scarcity price, and so we assume the unit’s marginal cost is 
equal to the scarcity price. 
                                                 
4 For example, if the probability of repair is 1% in each hour that the unit is still broken, then the probability that the 
unit has not yet been repaired after N hours is exp(– 0.01 × N) and the mean time to repair is 100 hours. Breakdowns 
are assumed to follow a similar pattern, but with much lower probability. 
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The simulation works as follows. We specify all the parameters: the marginal cost, the long-
run availability p, and mean time to repair r. We then start in hour 1, randomly making the 
generator available with probability p. For a generator that is available in hour 1, we determine 
the hour of its next failure, which is exponentially distributed with mean f. Suppose it is available 
for A hours. Then from hour 1 to hour A, the resource is available. We then determine how long 
it takes to repair, which is exponentially distributed with mean r. Suppose it takes U hours to 
repair. Then from hour A+1 to hour A+1+U, the resource is unavailable. We continue this 
process until availability is determined for all hours from October 1995 through May 2006. An 
analogous procedure is followed when the resource starts in the unavailable state. From this 
hourly availability time series, we calculate the monthly net firm energy payment, for every 
month and year in our time period. This gives us one data point for each month and year. We 
repeat the above procedure 1,000 times to give us the probability distribution of net firm energy 
payments for the hypothetical generating resource in each month and year. We calculate the 
mean, median, and standard deviation of this probability distribution for each month and each 
year in the time period. Throughout, years are December – November, except for the first year 
(October – November 1995) and the last year (December – May 2006). 
What is of particular interest is the risk—the variation of the payment away from the mean. 
The standard deviation is the most common measure of risk. For random variables that are 
approximately normally distributed, there is about a two-thirds chance that the realization of the 
random variable will fall within one standard deviation of the mean, and the probability is greater 
than 95% that the realization will fall within two standard deviation of the mean.  
It is helpful first to look at the historical data. Table 1 displays the number of scarcity hours 
in each year, together with the mean and standard deviation of the spot energy price during the 
year’s scarcity hours. Scarcity hours are frequent during the dry periods, but extremely rare at 
other times. Prices are both high and variable during scarcity hours. 
Table 1. Scarcity Hours by Year 
Energy Year Mean Standard Deviation
1995 (Oct-Nov) 223 76.86 27.81
1996 533 116.75 51.45
1997 2371 110.66 42.45




2002 17 63.92 2.93
2003 0
2004 2 85.18 0.67
2005 0
2006 (Dec-May) 0
Note: A scarcity hour is any hour in which spot price exceeds strike price.
Number of 
Scarcity Hours
Spot Price During Scarcity Hours
(Jan. 2006 US$ per MWh)
 
Table 2 shows the number of scarcity hours by month and year. Here we can see how 
frequent scarcity hours are during dry periods. From December 1997 through March 1998, 




Table 2. Scarcity Hours by Month and Year 
Energy 
Year December January February March April May June July August September October November Total
1995 - - - - - - - - - - 1 222 223
1996 467 57 1 8 533
1997 5 62 60 74 153 663 703 651 2,371




2002 16 1 17
2003 0
2004 1 1 2
2005 0
2006 - - - - - - -
Total 1,191 801 689 750 412 62 60 74 153 664 705 881 6,442
400-599 scarcity hours
600 or more scarcity hours
 
Table 3 shows thermal resources’ share of load by month. Not surprisingly thermal’s share 
of load is largest during the dry periods, and especially toward the end of the dry periods. 
However, even during the long and severe dry period of 1997-1998, hydro resources still 
provided the majority of energy. Thermal’s share only rarely exceeds one-third of load. 
Table 3. Thermal Resources Percent of Load by Month and Year 
Energy 
Year December January February March April May June July August September October November Average
1995 - - - - - - - - - - 15.4 14.7 15.0
1996 19.8 22.0 14.3 11.9 10.5 10.7 9.6 8.6 11.5 14.7 13.8 13.2 13.4
1997 14.0 10.8 12.6 14.0 14.9 17.3 16.0 17.8 20.2 26.7 28.8 31.8 18.7
1998 28.8 35.7 36.1 35.2 37.3 20.6 16.1 12.3 11.2 12.4 17.1 18.8 23.5
1999 17.9 18.9 17.5 16.1 17.6 18.4 16.7 19.3 18.9 26.1 20.0 23.4 19.2
2000 29.3 28.3 31.1 30.4 28.3 22.8 22.7 18.8 25.0 28.8 29.2 26.0 26.7
2001 19.2 25.9 29.9 31.1 32.5 29.3 26.0 21.7 21.2 21.9 19.9 24.5 25.3
2002 19.3 24.6 31.0 25.0 25.2 19.7 18.0 17.1 21.4 21.6 24.0 21.1 22.3
2003 27.6 25.6 24.7 27.2 23.8 21.6 17.7 14.3 18.3 21.8 19.2 16.8 21.6
2004 18.2 18.9 22.0 24.6 21.2 16.4 20.5 15.7 16.0 19.9 15.5 10.6 18.3
2005 16.7 18.1 18.1 17.8 21.1 15.2 17.0 20.1 24.2 26.6 16.6 15.1 18.9
2006 21.0 15.9 16.1 23.3 17.9 17.6 - - - - - - 18.6
Average 21.1 22.2 23.0 23.3 22.8 19.1 18.0 16.6 18.8 22.1 19.9 19.6 20.5
400-599 scarcity hours
600 or more scarcity hours
 
The simulation results for Model 1 are summarized in the following figures. 
Figure 1 displays the annual net firm energy payment for hypothetical thermal units with 
four different characteristics: the blue and red bars are for relatively unreliable thermal units 
(70% availability); green and mustard bars are for reliable thermal units (95% availability). In 
each case, the bar represents the mean net payment over the 1000 simulations. The median is the 
black square, and the grey interval displays plus and minus one standard deviation around the 































1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(Dec-May)
p=70%, r=10 hrs p=70%, r=40 hrs Annual PER
p=95%, r=10 hrs p=95%, r=40 hrs  
Median +/- 1 Std. Dev.
Long-run availability = p, Mean time to repair = r
Thermal annual net firm energy payment (thermal follows load)
 
1. The mean net firm energy payment does not depend on the unit’s anticipated 
availability. This is because we have assumed that each unit sells firm energy equal to its 
long-run availability. Hence, the 70% unit sells 70% as much firm energy as a perfectly 
reliable unit; it is paid at the same rate per MWh of firm energy, and so it receives 70% 
of the net firm energy payment—just as it should. Of course payments do depend on 
actual availability relative to anticipated availability. 
2. The mean net firm energy payment does not depend on the mean time to repair the unit. 
However, the standard deviation of the net payment does increase with the mean time to 
repair. Holding long-run availability constant, longer repair times mean longer run times. 
Because high-price hours are clustered, if a unit is out for a long time at once, it is more 
likely to miss a whole cluster of high-price hours or none at all. This increases the 
standard deviation, and therefore, the payment risk. 
3. The standard deviation, and hence risk, in the net payment is higher for less reliable 
units. This should be quite intuitive, since as the availability approaches 100%, the 
standard deviation goes to zero. 
4. The net payment is constant at $12.85 in all the years 1999 to 2006. This is because there 
were almost no scarcity hours during these years. This history is typical of Colombia. 
The vast majority of years have plenty of energy and low electricity prices.  
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5. Dry periods are unusual. Over this history, there was one major dry period from 27 
August 1997 to 20 April 1998. There was a second, shorter period from 20 November 
1995 to 30 December 1995 with high prices. This is the reason we only see significant 
Peak Energy Rents (the bright red x) during the 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 energy 
years. PER was especially high in 1997 and 1998 as a result of the long dry period. The 
situation became increasingly severe in the latter stage of the dry period (1998), which is 
why PER is highest in this energy year. PER does not vary with the unit’s 
characteristics; it only depends on the unit’s obligation, the number of scarcity hours, 
and the spread between the spot price and the scarcity price in each of those scarcity 
hours. 
6. Even in the two years, 1997 and 1998, covering the extended dry period, the standard 
deviation of the net payment is small relative to the mean. The risk is greatest for an 
unreliable unit with long repair times, but for reliable units the risk is tiny even for units 
with long repair times.  
7. Even in dry years, the mean net payment is close to $12.85. In 1997 and 1998, the two 
years covering the extended dry period, the net payment is about 7% lower: roughly 
$11.87 in 1997 and $12.08 in 1998. Because of the load-following obligation, the 
supplier has a larger obligation in high-load hours than in low-load hours. Although it 
can fulfill its obligation on average, during some high-load hours its obligation exceeds 
its capacity. This is made up for by lower load hours in which its capacity exceeds it 
obligation. However higher-load hours tend to be higher-priced hours, so it loses more 
when it falls short, than it gains when it provides extra. Thus, thermal units tends to have 
a net penalty in years with many scarcity hours.  
This last point motivates consideration of the variation, thermal constant, discussed above, 
in which the thermal obligation is constant at its long-run availability, unless load is so low that 
this obligation would exceed load. 
Figure 2 presents the net firm energy payments under the thermal-constant variation. The 
figure looks remarkably similar to Figure 1. The only difference is that the mean payments have 
increased in 1997 and 1998, by an amount roughly equal to the mean net penalty in these two 
years under the load-following rule. This is just as expected, since under the thermal-constant 
variation, the thermal units no longer have a net penalty on average during years with lots of 































1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(Dec-May)
p=70%, r=10 hrs p=70%, r=40 hrs Annual PER
p=95%, r=10 hrs p=95%, r=40 hrs  
Median +/- 1 Std. Dev.
Long-run availability = p, Mean time to repair = r
Thermal annual net firm energy payment (thermal constant)
 
Notice that although the thermal-constant approach succeeded in eliminating the mean net 
penalties in these difficult years, the variation has almost no impact on risk. The standard 
deviations of the net payments are nearly unchanged across the two approaches. 
One explanation for why differences are small between the two approaches is the fact that 
there is little correlation between the spot price and load (normalized as the percent of the annual 
peak load). This correlation is only 0.18, which is so small it is difficult to detect any correlation 
in the scatter plot of price and load shown in Figure 3. It must, however, be remembered that in 
the future this correlation could either increase because the spot price will be freer to respond to 
load or decrease because hydro units will perform more efficiently, absent an incentive to 





3.2 Modeling hydro units 
Next we turn to a hypothetical hydro unit. With thermal units, it was clear what the main 
source of risk was: outages. For a hydro unit, it is less clear how best to model hydro risk with 
respect to the hedge. There are at least three potential sources of risk. 
The first is that the unit has an outage during a dry period. We view this risk as extremely 
minor because hydro units tend to be reliable, and more importantly having an outage results in 
little loss, because the unit can be fixed and its output can be shifted to other high-priced hours. 
No firm energy is actually lost. For this reason, we ignore this potential risk.5 
The second source of risk is that the unit may have less firm energy than it sold, and so it 
must buy additional energy in the spot market. There are two possible explanations for the 
shortage and each has different implications. 
First, the shortage of firm energy may be system wide, because it is drier than the dry period 
used in certifying firm energy. This would be a large source of risk if the firm energy 
certifications were biased upward. However, if the worst-case benchmark establishing the 
certification benchmark really is a worst-case, then this should not be a problem. Only in the 
most exceptional circumstances would hydro units in aggregate have less firm energy than was 
sold.  
                                                 
5 One concern is that a landslide may disrupt the hydro unit for an extended period of time and may result in a loss 
of water. Of course, these events are presumably much more likely in wet periods than dry periods, unless the 
landslide is the result of an earthquake, but a major earthquake would be a good example of a force majeure event 
where the obligation would be relaxed. 
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Second, the shortage of firm energy may be regional, because the rainfall that has come has 
missed this unit’s reservoir. The distribution of rainfall across the mountains of Colombia may 
vary in the North-South dimension from year to year. For example, if the rainfall fell further 
south in a particular year, then presumably the reservoirs in the South would have more water 
and the reservoirs in the North would have less water. Thus, the Southern units would over-
perform and the Northern units would under-perform relative to the firm energy obligation. 
We represent both sources of shortage risk as follows. We assume 1 MW hydro unit’s firm 
energy capability in any dry period is normally distributed with mean p and standard deviation 
sd. Let p = .3 or .5 and sd = .1 or .15. Thus, we consider four different cases as before. In each 
dry period, the unit gets a new independent draw from the normal distribution to determine its 
quantity of firm energy. For the hydro simulations, there were two dry periods—the short period 
from 11/20/95 – 12/30/95 and the long period from 8/27/97 – 4/20/98. 
We assume the unit sells firm energy based on its mean capability, since it does not observe 
its actual capability until several years after the auction. 
Finally, we assume that the hydro unit manages its output to supply in the highest-priced 
hours of each day. This makes sense, since the hydro unit submits a daily bid and then is 
dispatched in each of the hours where the price is above its bid. Hence, the hypothetical hydro 
unit with firm energy of x% of its capacity, provides x% of load in each day, but it puts that x% 
in the highest priced hours for the day. Consider an example in which the unit has a firm energy 
factor of 20%. Thus, over the 24 hours, it can generate 24 × .2 = 4.8 MW. We sort the hours in 
order of price from highest to lowest and dispatch the unit to supply in the five highest priced 
hours as follows: 
Hour 5pm 4pm 6pm 3pm 7pm Total
Energy price $175 $160 $145 $140 $134































1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(Dec-May)
p=30%, sd=10% p=30%, sd=15% Annual PER
p=50%, sd=10% p=50%, sd=15%  
Median +/- 1 Std. Dev.
Dry period availability = p, Standard deviation = sd
Hydro annual net firm energy payment (thermal follows load)
 
Figure 4 displays the hydro unit’s net firm energy payment for the case where the obligation 
follows load. During the vast majority of years, the firm energy payment is constant. There are 
no scarcity hours and no risk associated with prices above the scarcity price. In contrast, during 
the dry periods, especially 1997-1998, the mean net firm energy payment increases, but has 
significant variation due to the large standard deviation in the unit’s actual firm energy. Of 































1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(Dec-May)
p=30%, sd=10% p=30%, sd=15% Annual PER
p=50%, sd=10% p=50%, sd=15%  
Median +/- 1 Std. Dev.
Dry period availability = p, Standard deviation = sd
Hydro annual net firm energy payment (thermal constant)
 
Figure 5 shows the net firm energy payment of are hypothetical hydro unit for the case in 
which the thermal resources have a nearly constant obligation, and the hydro resources follow 
load for the residual demand. Interestingly, this change has almost no impact on either risk or the 





























Thermal follows load Thermal constant
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
p=70%, r=10 hrs p=70%, r=40 hrs Annual PER
p=95%, r=10 hrs p=95%, r=40 hrs  
Median +/- 1 Std. Dev.
Long-run availability = p, Mean time to repair = r
Thermal annual net firm energy payment
 
To better see the risk in the proposal and in the variation, Figure 6 displays the net firm 
energy payment for a thermal resource under each of the cases for the three years with dry 
periods. In all years without dry periods, the net firm energy payment is constant and has no risk. 
The figure confirms that there is almost no difference in risk between the two cases. Indeed, the 
risk to the thermal unit is slight in both cases. The reason is that the mean repair time is short 
relative to the length of the dry periods. Risk does increase with the mean time to repair, but does 
not appear to depend on whether thermal follows load or has a constant obligation during 
scarcity hours. The thermal unit is slightly worse off when it is asked to follow load, but the 





























Thermal follows load Thermal constant
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
p=30%, sd=10% p=30%, sd=15% Annual PER
p=50%, sd=10% p=50%, sd=15%  
Median +/- 1 Std. Dev.
Dry period availability = p, Standard deviation = sd
Hydro annual net firm energy payment
 
We get a similar result for the hydro unit, as shown in Figure 7. Risk is unchanged across 
the two alternatives. The hydro resource is slightly better off when the thermal resources follow 
load, but the impact is minor.  
Given that risk is unchanged across the two approaches, and mean payments are only 
slightly changed, we believe it is best to continue with the original proposal in which all 
resources follow load in the same way.  
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4 Model 2: Historical estimation of net firm energy payment 
We now consider a model even more closely tied to historical data. In particular, we look at 
the individual unit data, and ask the question: “What would net firm energy payments be if the 
firm energy market was in operation through our entire sample period (beginning in 1995)?” An 
important assumption in this analysis is that the firm energy market would not influence prices or 
the operation of the generating units. In Model 2, we directly calculate for each unit the net firm-
energy payment based on historical price, operation, and firm energy capability. Since risk is 
evaluated at a company level, rather than at the unit level, we aggregate the data by company. 





















































EEPPM 2,106 664 808 52.8% 31.5% 38.3% 455 452 75.5% 99.4% 2,561 1,116 1,260 19.2%
EMGESA 2,400 820 1,004 36.4% 34.2% 41.8% 358 223 73.7% 62.2% 2,758 1,043 1,227 18.7%
TEBSA 1,179 1,018 77.3% 86.4% 1,179 1,018 1,018 15.5%
ISAGEN 1,826 536 625 37.6% 29.4% 34.2% 285 271 86.0% 95.0% 2,111 807 896 13.6%
Flores 447 411 58.2% 91.9% 447 411 411 6.3%
Termocandelaria 314 294 0.0% 93.8% 314 294 294 4.5%
GENSA 314 277 77.7% 88.2% 314 277 277 4.2%
TERMOEMCALI 233 213 20.2% 91.2% 233 213 213 3.2%
TERMOVALLE 205 199 31.3% 97.0% 205 199 199 3.0%
Termotasajero 155 149 82.8% 96.1% 155 149 149 2.3%
MERILÉCTRICA 169 146 53.5% 86.2% 169 146 146 2.2%
AES CHIVOR 1,000 138 161 27.7% 13.8% 16.1% 1,000 138 161 2.5%
EPSA2 863 107 141 21.3% 12.4% 16.3% 863 107 141 2.1%
PROELECTRICA 90 88 80.3% 98.0% 90 88 88 1.3%
Termoyopal 49 39 46.3% 79.7% 49 39 39 0.6%
Urrá 335 27 35 39.8% 8.1% 10.5% 335 27 35 0.5%
ESSA3 23 2 2 6.9% 6.9% 14 13 57.5% 94.9% 37 15 15 0.2%
Total 8,552 2,294 2,776 38.2% 26.8% 32.5% 4,267 3,793 63.3% 88.9% 12,820 6,087 6,568 100.0%
Hydro Resources Thermal Resources All Resources
Notes: 
1The listed capacities and firm energies for each company may include units that were not used in the availability calculation because not all units were present in the generation output data. Companies 
are not included in this table if none of their units were present in the generation output data. Units are assigned to their current company.
2EPSA availability and capacity includes the one CHIDRAL unit because EPSA's ALTO ANCHICAYA unit is combined with CHIDRAL's BAJO ANCHICAYA unit in the output data.
3ESSA's two units that were present in the generation output data were retired in 2004 and 2005. The capacity listed represents units that were not in the generation output data.  
Table 4 shows the capacity, availability, and firm energy for each company in our 
generation output data. The firm energy numbers are the preliminary firm energy numbers, as 
determined by XM in August 2006 based on CREG resolution 043. There are actually two firm 
energy numbers for hydro resources. One is the reference quantity, which is based on a 98% 
chance that the actual quantity of firm energy for the resource will exceed what is needed. The 
other is the maximum quantity, which is based on a 95% chance that the actual quantity of firm 
energy for the resource will exceed the obligation. The companies are sorted in descending order 
based on total firm energy, using the reference quantity. In aggregate, hydro resources over 
performed—availability of 38.2% exceeds firm energy/capacity—and thermal resources under 
performed—availability of 63.3% is below firm energy/capacity. 
A critical element in the net firm energy payment calculation is the quantity of firm energy 
sold by the resource. In all the calculations that follow, we assume a load-following obligation 
for all resources. We also assume that the quantity of firm energy sold by the resource is equal to 
its firm-energy certification. For hydro resources we consider both the reference and maximum 
firm-energy quantities.  
As in Model 1, we assume a firm energy payment of $12.85/MWh. The calculation is done 
each hour for each unit, and then aggregated up to either a monthly or an annual result. The 




































1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(Dec-May)
Thermal NFE (Reference hydro FE, thermal follows load) Thermal annual PER (Reference hydro FE, thermal follows load)
Thermal NFE (Reference hydro FE, thermal constant) Thermal annual PER (Reference hydro FE, thermal constant)
Thermal NFE (Maximum hydro FE, thermal follows load) Thermal annual PER (Maximum hydro FE, thermal follows load)
Thermal NFE (Maximum hydro FE, thermal constant) Thermal annual PER (Maximum hydro FE, thermal constant)
Hydro NFE (Reference hydro FE, thermal follows load) Hydro annual PER (Reference hydro FE, thermal follows load)
Hydro NFE (Reference hydro FE, thermal constant) Hydro annual PER (Reference hydro FE, thermal constant)
Hydro NFE (Maximum hydro FE, thermal follows load) Hydro annual PER (Maximum hydro FE, thermal follows load)
Hydro NFE (Maximum hydro FE, thermal constant) Hydro annual PER (Maximum hydro FE, thermal constant)
Annual net firm energy payment (NFE)
All Thermal and Hydro Units
 
We begin by calculating the net firm energy payment for each unit and then aggregating the 
units by type, either thermal or hydro. Figure 8 shows how hydro resources do better than 
thermal resources during the dry periods. There are two reasons for this. First and most 
important, the hydro resources over performed on average in dry periods; whereas, the thermal 
resources under performed. Second, hydro resources get an additional premium because of their 
greater ability to follow load. This premium is largest when the thermal obligation follows load, 
rather than is constant. Nonetheless, the net firm energy payments for thermal units are not too 
far below the payment obtained in wet periods, especially in the thermal constant case. 
One problem with Model 1 is that it focused on a single resource. This tends to overstate 
risk, since most companies operate a portfolio of generating units, and indeed the portfolio is 
selected with risk in mind. A major benefit of Model 2 is that it enables us to look at generator 
risk from a company perspective. 
We calculate the net firm energy payments for each company and for each year. The net 
firm energy payment includes all cash flows from the firm energy payment as well as for 
performance above or below the company’s obligation during scarcity hours (hours in which the 
spot price is above the scarcity price). Calculations are done both for thermal follows load and 
































































































































Companies Ranked 1 through 4 by 1998 Capacity Market Share
Reference firm energy used for hydro units





























































































































Companies Ranked 1 through 4 by 1998 Capacity Market Share
Reference firm energy used for hydro units
Annual Net Firm Energy Payments (thermal constant)
 
Figure 9 shows the net firm energy payment for the four-largest companies in Colombia, 
assuming that hydro units sell the reference level of firm energy. Most importantly, notice that 
the net firm energy payment is roughly constant. The payment does fall somewhat during the dry 
periods for EMGESA and TEBSA, under performers in 1997-1998, and rise during the dry 
































































































































Companies Ranked 1 through 4 by 1998 Capacity Market Share
Maximum firm energy used for hydro units





























































































































Companies Ranked 1 through 4 by 1998 Capacity Market Share
Maximum firm energy used for hydro units
Annual Net Firm Energy Payments (thermal constant)
 
Figure 10 presents the same calculation, but this time assuming that hydro units sell at their 
































































































































Companies Ranked 5 through 8 by 1998 Capacity Market Share
Reference firm energy used for hydro units





























































































































Companies Ranked 5 through 8 by 1998 Capacity Market Share
Reference firm energy used for hydro units
Annual Net Firm Energy Payments (thermal constant)
 
Figure 11 shows the net firm energy payment for the next four-largest companies in 
Colombia, assuming that hydro units sell the reference level of firm energy. For these four 
companies there is a bit more variability. In particular, AES CHIVOR is a significant over 
performer in 1997-1998, generating twice its reference firm energy, and Flores is a significant 
































































































































Companies Ranked 5 through 8 by 1998 Capacity Market Share
Maximum firm energy used for hydro units





























































































































Companies Ranked 5 through 8 by 1998 Capacity Market Share
Maximum firm energy used for hydro units
Annual Net Firm Energy Payments (thermal constant)
 
Figure 12 presents the same calculation, but this time assuming that hydro units sell at their 
maximum firm energy level. This reduces AES Chivor’s over performance in 1997-1998 
somewhat. Otherwise, the results are the same. 
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5 Model 3: Simulation of the market going forward 
Model 3 is designed to simulate the firm energy market, its stream of investments in new 
capacity, and the risks to investors. The model allows us to estimate the impact of variations in 
the auction design. Models 1 and 2 did a good job of assessing risk to investors, but the models 
were closely tied to historical prices (Models 1 and 2) and historical units and output decisions 
(Model 2). Moreover, the annual auction and supplier investment decisions was not modeled, so 
questions specific to the annual auction and investments over time could not be addressed.  
Model 3, by explicitly modeling the annual auction and investments, is able to consider 
other questions. For example, we can look at the distribution of acquired firm energy relative to 
the target firm energy. Also, we can consider variations in the proposal. For example, the 
proposal has a parameter of 4%, which determines the slope of the demand curve around the firm 
energy target. We can evaluate the impact of setting this demand curve parameter to 2%, rather 
than 4%; that is, a case where the demand curve around the firm energy target is twice as steep as 
in the original proposal. Finally, we can explore the impact of demand response on the market 
outcomes.  
Model 3 does not attempt to model every aspect of the Colombia electricity system, nor 
every aspect of the firm energy market. Simplification is essential to any modeling exercise and 
this is no exception. What we have done is identified the critical elements to model explicitly. 
Other elements are handled with simplifying assumptions. As an example, in Model 3 we do not 
explicitly model the outages of thermal resources; rather, we assume an availability in each hour 
consistent with the long-run availability of the thermal resources. The analysis from Models 1 
and 2 demonstrated that the risk for thermal units as a result of outages is small when 
performance is measured over one or more years. Thus, explicit modeling of outages of each unit 
would greatly add to the complexity of the calculations, but not have any significant impact on 
results. In contrast, the explicit modeling of the energy output of hydro resources is absolutely 
essential. 
5.1 Description of the simulation 
The basic features of the model are as follows. 
Stationarity 
For simplicity, the model has a stationary structure. For example, we assume a random 
exponential growth in load with a mean of 3% per year. In order to keep the market functioning 
for decades in a way that is similar to how it will function at the start, we scale project sizes to 
keep them the same size relative to total load today. Thus, after 20 years of growth, averaging 
3% per year, projects are assumed to be about 75% larger than they are today. Doing this 
simplifies the modeling and makes the results more relevant. In particular, it maintains the 
importance of lumpy projects regardless of the length of the simulation. 
All monetary values are in real US dollars. One must be careful in interpreting results. In 
some cases, the specific numbers are less meaningful than other statistics about the numbers. For 
example, the particular firm energy price is largely a function of the cost parameters, such as the 
fixed costs of each plant type. The parameters have been chosen so that the long-run equilibrium 
is close to the existing mix of plant types. However, one can easily increase the firm energy 
clearing price by a constant simply by raising the fixed cost of each plant type by the same 
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amount. What is much more relevant is the change in the numbers, both over time, and across 
scenarios.  
Duration 
A key input to the simulation is the 1000 years (100 ten-year series) of hydro energy output 
as simulated by XM. We make use of all of this data in each scenario by conducting 50 20-year 
simulations. This is useful for looking at the behavior from the initial state, as it converges to the 
long-run equilibrium. By doing 50 simulations in each case, we are able to see the distribution of 
market outcomes. 
Energy price and demand  
The scarcity price is set at PS = $100/MWh. We are not modeling changes in fuel costs, so 
the scarcity price is fixed throughout the simulation. 
Load in each hour is modeled from the most recent five years of load data. For prices less 
than the scarcity price, demand is vertical (completely inelastic). For prices greater than the 
scarcity price, demand has constant elasticity of –.05. This means that a 20% increase in price is 
needed to produce a 1% decline in quantity demanded. Such hours will be considered scarcity 
hours. This elasticity produces a downward sloping demand for energy, which allows us to 
match supply and demand during dry periods. Price rather than rationing is used to balance the 
market.  
Specifically, the demand in any particular hour is determined as follows. Let the last five 
years (May 2001 to Apr 2006) be sample years (a sample year is a year of hourly loads); we 
remove 29 February 2004, so all years have 365 days. We then scale the data in each energy year 
so that that total energy over the year is the same as in the last year (May 2005 to Apr 2006). For 
each year of the simulation, we pick a sample year randomly. Load in hour h is equal to load in 
hour h of the sample year scaled for growth.  The growth G in each year is normally distributed 
with mean 3% and standard deviation of 1%. That is,  
scale factor in year T = scale factor in year T–1 times (1 + G).  
Growth may be negative, although this is unlikely. 
All simulations assume as an initial condition that in year 0, the firm energy target is equal 
to the firm energy resources—that is, we start in a condition of neither surplus nor shortage. The 
auctions for future years only need to accommodate the load growth. 
Resources 
The model includes three types of investments: hydro (H), baseload (B), and peakers (P). 
Peakers and baseload are characterized by a fixed cost, a variable cost, a capacity, and a long-run 
availability; whereas hydro is characterized by a fixed cost, a capacity, and a quantity of firm 
energy. The characteristics of new units are based on the characteristics of existing units.  
There are 59 existing generators in the simulation:  26 hydro, 17 baseload, and 16 peaker 
units. Peakers are defined as gas-fired units with heat rates of 9 and higher. All other thermal 
resources are baseload units. New units of each type are drawn from these existing units. For 
baseload and peaker units, only the capacity is inherited from the existing unit. For hydro units, 
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the firm energy is inherited as well as the simulated hydro energy for the 1000 years. The 
existing resources are shown in Table 5 and summarized in Table 6.  
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Table 5. Existing resources included in Model 3 
Unit type (1) Unit name
Actual owner 
(July 2006)
Owner when reassigned 
to a top 10 company for 
Model 3 simulations (2)
Firm Energy 
(Maximum for Hydro; 
Full Contract for 
Thermal) in MWh
Unit capacity 





Peaker FLORES 3 Flores Flores 153.9 175 (6) gas 9.6
Peaker CANDELARIA2 Termocandelaria Termocandelaria 148.2 157 (4) gas 9.7
Peaker CANDELARIA1 Termocandelaria Termocandelaria 146.2 157 (4) gas 9.5
Peaker MERILECTRICA MERILÉCTRICA ISAGEN 145.7 169 gas 9.6
Peaker GUAJIRA 1 TEBSA TEBSA 130.3 151 (7) gas 9.8
Peaker GUAJIRA 2 TEBSA TEBSA 129.5 151 (7) gas 9.7
Peaker FLORES 2 Flores Flores 107.3 112 (6) gas 10.2
Peaker CARTAGENA 2 EMGESA EMGESA 54.4 54 (5) gas 9.9 (11)
Peaker CARTAGENA 3 EMGESA EMGESA 53.9 70 (5) gas 9.9
Peaker BARRANQUILL3 TEBSA TEBSA 53.0 64 (3) gas 9.7
Peaker CARTAGENA 1 EMGESA EMGESA 51.1 64 (5) gas 9.9 (11)
Peaker BARRANQUILL4 TEBSA TEBSA 43.0 63 (3) gas 11.0
Peaker TERMODORADA1 CHEC Flores 37.1 51 gas 9.7
Peaker TERMO YOPAL2 Termoyopal TERMOEMCALI 27.1 30 gas 12.7
Peaker PALENQUE 3 ESSA ISAGEN 13.3 14 gas 14.3
Peaker TERMO YOPAL1 Termoyopal TERMOVALLE 12.4 19 gas 13.0
Baseload TEBSAB TEBSA TEBSA 662.5 750 gas 7.3
Baseload TERMOSIERRA EEPPM EEPPM 452.0 455 gas 6.4
Baseload TERMOCENTRO ISAGEN ISAGEN 270.6 285 gas 7.1
Baseload EMCALI TERMOEMCALI TERMOEMCALI 212.6 233 gas 6.8
Baseload TERMOVALLE 2 TERMOVALLE TERMOVALLE 198.9 205 gas 6.6
Baseload FLORES 1 Flores Flores 149.5 160 (6) gas 7.2
Baseload TASAJERO 1 Termotasajero TEBSA 148.9 155 coal 9.5
Baseload PAIPA 4 GENSA GENSA 139.1 150 (8) coal 9.3
Baseload ZIPAEMG4 EMGESA EMGESA 63.9 64 (10) coal 9.0
Baseload ZIPAEMG5 EMGESA EMGESA 62.8 64 (10) coal 8.7
Baseload ZIPAEMG3 EMGESA EMGESA 62.8 63 (10) coal 9.6
Baseload PAIPA 2 GENSA GENSA 59.1 68 (8) coal 12.2
Baseload PAIPA 3 GENSA GENSA 56.2 68 (8) coal 12.3
Baseload PROELECTRIC2 PROELECTRICA GENSA 44.3 45 (9) gas 8.2 (12)
Baseload PROELECTRIC1 PROELECTRICA Termocandelaria 43.9 45 (9) gas 8.2 (12)
Baseload ZIPAEMG2 EMGESA EMGESA 33.3 34 (10) coal 12.8
Baseload PAIPA 1 GENSA GENSA 22.7 28 (8) coal 13.5
Hydro GUAVIO EMGESA EMGESA 525.5 1150
Hydro SAN CARLOS ISAGEN ISAGEN 475.7 1240
Hydro CHIVOR AES CHIVOR AES CHIVOR 329.3 1000
Hydro PAGUA EMGESA EMGESA 307.7 600
Hydro GUATRON EEPPM EEPPM 260.1 512
Hydro GUATAPE EEPPM EEPPM 219.2 560
Hydro BETANIA EMGESA EMGESA 157.7 540
Hydro PORCE II EEPPM EEPPM 153.4 405
Hydro PLAYAS EEPPM EEPPM 135.6 201
Hydro LA TASAJERA EEPPM EEPPM 121.6 306
Hydro MIEL I ISAGEN ISAGEN 115.3 396
Hydro URRA Urrá EEPPM 84.2 335
Hydro ALTOANCHICAY EPSA EMGESA 73.6 365
Hydro JAGUAS ISAGEN ISAGEN 47.1 170
Hydro SALVAJINA EPSA EEPPM 28.7 285
Hydro SANFRANCISCO CHEC EMGESA 23.0 135
Hydro FLORIDA CEDELCA EMGESA 18.3 20
Hydro ESMERALDA CHEC EMGESA 17.1 30
Hydro INSULA CHEC EMGESA 16.9 19
Hydro BAJOANCHICAY EPSA Flores 16.4 74
Hydro CALIMA EPSA Flores 11.3 132
Hydro RIOMAYO CEDENAR EMGESA 9.5 21
Hydro PRADO ELECTROLIMA EEPPM 6.5 45
Hydro PRADO4 ELECTROLIMA EEPPM 4.3 5
Hydro CALDERAS ISAGEN ISAGEN 3.8 20
Hydro RIOGRANDE 1 EEPPM EEPPM 0.4 25
Notes:
(1) We classify a unit as a peaker if it is a gas-fired unit with a heat rate of at least 9.5 MBTU/MWh. We classify all other thermal units as baseload units.
(2) We estimate the Top 10 companies as ranked by maximum firm energy, and then reassigned each unit owned by a non-top 10 company to a top-10 company. 
We keep each top-10 company's share of the total firm energy for the top 10 companies roughly the same as it was before reassigning the units.
(3) - (10) The July 2006 capacity data contained aggregate data for these units. We estimated the unit-specific capacities using their pro rata shares of capacity as 
of December 2005. Using this method, the capacities of ZIPAEMG3, ZIPAEMG4, and CARTAGENA 2 were slightly greater than their firm energies (less than 2 
MW). Therefore, we set the capacities of those units equal to their firm energies. 
(11) The heat rates for Cartagena 1 and Cartagena 2 were not available. We assume they are equal to the heat rate reported for Cartagena 3.










Peaker 16 1,306 1,502
Baseload 17 2,683 2,871
Hydro 26 3,162 8,591
Total 59 7,152 12,964  
Firm energy is stated in average hourly terms; that is, annual firm energy / 8760. 
New unit characteristics are determined as follows. First consider peakers. We randomly 
order the vector of peaker capacities, doing this many times to construct a list of peaker 
capacities for each of the 50 twenty-year simulations.  Peaker capacities are then drawn in 
sequence from this list. With this approach since we have 16 existing peakers, each peaker size is 
selected once after 16 peaker entries in any given simulation, twice after 32 peaker entries, and 
so on. Capacities are scaled up for growth, as described below. The same approach is used for 
baseload and hydro entry. However, for hydro entry, the firm energy and the energy series are 
inherited from the existing plant characteristics. Hydro energy and firm energy is scaled up for 
growth as well. 
The characteristics of each unit of a particular type are as follows: 
Ai = long-run availability of type i resource; AH = 100%; AB = 93%; AP = 87% 
Baseload and peaker availabilities are based on average availability of each resource type. For 
simplicity, rather than simulate thermal outages, as we did in Model 1, here we will use average 
availabilities. This simplification has little impact on risk, as was demonstrated in the Model 1 
analysis. 
Ci = capacity of type i resource (MW); based on existing units as described above. 
FEi = firm energy of type i resource (MWh); FEH = Table 5; FEB = AB CB; FEP = AP CP 
For hydro units we use the “maximum” firm energy (not “reference”). We do this because we 
believe that most participants will find it profitable to sell the maximum firm energy. 
VCi = variable cost of type i resource ($/MWh); VCH = $0; VCB = $50; VCP = $80 
FCi = fixed cost of type i resource ($/MWh of FE); FCH = $90.60; FCB = $8; FCP = $3.90 
The fixed costs were chosen so that the long-run equilibrium mix of plants is close to the existing 
mix of plants. 
Supply and price determination in the spot energy market 
The spot energy market assumes each unit bids its marginal cost, including its opportunity 
cost in the case of hydro. The first step is to determine the opportunity cost of hydro which is 
done by constructing the monthly supply as a function of hydro’s opportunity cost, MCH.  
Define: 
L = hourly load 
MCi = marginal cost of type i resource ($/MWh); MCB = VCB; MCP = VCP 
Ei = maximum energy the resources of type i can supply in the month 
EH is given from the hydro series for each hydro unit, and then summed over units. 
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EB is the baseload energy available to the extent that baseload available capacity does not 
exceed load. EB = the hourly sum of min(AB CB, L). 
EP is the peak energy available to the extent that baseload plus peakload available capacity 
does not exceed load. EP = the hourly sum of min(AP CP, L – AB CB). 
These definitions allow us to draw a supply curve as shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Monthly determination of the hydro opportunity cost 
 
Intersecting the supply and demand curves determines the hydro opportunity cost for a given 
month. Because the demand curve is vertical at D, MCH will equal $0, MCB, MCP, or something 
greater. These four cases can be described using the following definitions: 
ei = energy output over the month for units of type i 
p = spot price 
D = monthly energy demand before demand response.  
D(MCH) = demand as a function of the hydro opportunity cost. 
D(MCH) = D if MCH ≤ PS. 
D(MCH) = D×(MCH /PS) β, where β = –.05 = elasticity, if MCH > PS. 
There are four cases that determine prices and output for the entire month. 
Case 1 (MCH = $0): p = 0 in all hours.  eH = D, eB = eP = 0. 
Case 2 (MCH = MCB):  p = MCB in all hours.  eH = EH, eB = D – eH, eP = 0. 
Case 3 (MCH = MCP): p = MCB or MCP.  eH = EH, eB = EB,  eP = D – eH – eB. 
Case 4 (MCH > MCP):  p = MCB or MCP or MCH. eH = EH, eB = EB,  eP = EP. 
Hydro Opportunity Cost, MCH, 
 














Note that hourly calculations determine how much baseload energy is sold at MCB, MCP and 
MCH. Similar calculations are used for peaker energy output at MCP and MCH. Hydro supplies 
the residual that is not supplied by baseload and peakers. 
In Case 1, hydro supplies all the hourly load.  
In Case 2, baseload provides a constant amount in each hour (the constant amount is 
calculated from the fact that hydro supplies EH over the month), except when this amount would 
be greater than load for that hour (in which case baseload supplies all the load in the hour, and 
the constant baseload hourly output is recalculated for remaining hours). Hydro supplies the 
residual, which equals EH over the month.  
In Case 3, baseload supplies its long-run availability in each hour or 100% of load, 
whichever is less. Peaker provides a constant amount in each hour (the constant amount is 
calculated from baseload’s hourly output and the fact that hydro supplies EH over the month), 
except when this amount would be greater than load for that hour (in which case peakers supply 
the residual load after baseload’s output in the hour, and the constant peaker hourly output is 
recalculated for remaining hours). Hydro supplies residual hourly load, which totals EH. 
In Case 4, baseload is dispatched first in each hour up to its long-run availability. Peaker is 
dispatched second in each hour up to its long-run availability. Hydro provides a constant amount 
in each hour (the constant amount is calculated from the hourly output of baseload and peaker, 
and the fact that hydro supplies EH over the month), except when this amount would be greater 
than load for that hour (in which case hydro supplies the residual load after the output of 
baseload and peaker in the hour, and the constant hydro hourly output is recalculated for the 
remaining hours). This results in load being reduced in those hours with dispatched hydro, 
consistent with the demand response at prices above the scarcity price. 
Obligation 
Each unit sells its firm energy in the annual firm energy auction. New units select a 10-year 
commitment period. Existing units have a one-year commitment. The obligation is the thermal-
constant case. Each thermal resource has an obligation equal to the unit’s firm energy (capacity 
times long-run availability), provided these obligations sum to less than load in the hour; 
otherwise, the obligation is reduced proportionately to match load. Hydro resources follow the 
residual demand, which is the actual demand less the thermal obligation. Obligations are 
adjusted on a monthly basis based on the deviation between the quantity of firm energy 
purchased and the actual load. That is, if only 98% of actual load was purchased, then 
obligations are reduced by 2% in each hour. 
Bidding in the firm energy market 
Bids in the auction are assumed to be competitive, which means they should be just high 
enough that the investor expects to break even including a normal return on equity. We assume 
that the fixed cost per MWh of firm energy includes the cost of equity. A competitive bid then is 
such that the investment has an expected profit of zero. The bid depends on the fraction of firm 
energy coming from each of the three resource types. 
Fi = fraction of firm energy from resource type i. FP + FH + FB = 1, so FH and FB determine 
FP and therefore the entire mix of resources. 
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bi(FH, FB) = competitive bid of type i resource given the hydro and baseload shares of firm 
energy. 
In the long-run equilibrium, the shares of each resource are such that the optimal bids of all 
types are the same; that is, FH and FB are such that bH(FH, FB) = bB(FH, FB) = bP(FH, FB). Because 
of lumpy investment, we are actually never at the long-run equilibrium.  
We begin by calculating the competitive bid for each resource type as a function of the mix 
of resources. This is the firm energy price, which would result in zero expected profits given the 
mix of resources. To calculate bH(FH, FB), bB(FH, FB), bP(FH, FB), we just run the simulation for 
1000 years. Effectively there are three units: FH of hydro, FB of baseload, and FP of peaker. Units 
are never added or subtracted. The energy of the hydro “unit” is just aggregating all the existing 
hydro units and normalizing so there is FH of maximum firm energy. 
We compute bH(FH, FB), bB(FH, FB), bP(FH, FB) for each combination of FH between 28% 
and 55% at 1% increments and each FB between 27% and 60% at 1% increments, while 
constraining FP to never exceed 25% or be less than 10%. 
Once we compute the matrix of bids, then a scenario involves running 50 twenty-year 
simulations, adding the most profitable units as needed until supply exceeds demand. We match 
bids from the bid matrix to each year in each simulation by rounding the FH and FB in that year to 
the nearest 1%.  When multiple units are required in a year, we may add some of each. Units are 
added sequentially, always adding the type that is most profitable, given shares (FH, FB). For 
example, suppose we are close to the long run equilibrium, so that all three are nearly equal in 
profitability, but that hydro is the most profitable. We add a hydro unit. But now with more 
hydro, baseload is best. We add a baseload unit. But with more baseload, peaker now is most 
profitable. We add a peaker, which gives us enough firm energy to reach the target. Thus, in this 
example, we add one unit of each. This sequential approach actually does a better job of 
approximating a descending clock auction in which the bidders observe the quantity of each 
resource type as the auction progresses. 
Key to the analysis is identifying the regions where a particular type of resource is best; that 
is, most profitable among the three types of resources. For example, the regions may look 

















As mentioned, we add the most-profitable unit in sequence until we get to the point where 
FE supply > FE demand. This last unit is accepted or not, based on the “minimize total cost in 
the first commitment year” rule. This means we compare: 
Quantity with the unit times Price with the unit, and 
Quantity without the unit times Price without the unit, where 
Price with the unit is the unit’s competitive bid price, and Price without the unit is read from 
the firm energy demand curve evaluated at the quantity without the unit (this is a higher price, 
since supply < demand without the unit). 
We accept the last unit if it has a lower total cost. 
Model outputs 
So that we can examine company risk, each new project is assigned to one of 10 companies. 
We take the top-10 existing companies in terms of maximum firm energy, and scale these up so 
the total market share is 100%. This results in the following target market shares.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
22.2% 21.1% 15.8% 14.2% 6.4% 5.1% 4.6% 4.3% 3.3% 3.1%
Target Market Shares for Ten Companies
 
When a new project is added, it is added to the company that is most under its target market 
shares. The existing units that are not currently owned by one of the top-10 companies are 
assigned to a top-10 company to approximate the target market shares. 
For each simulation year, we compute the components of profit on a unit basis. We also 
compute company profits. The model outputs are all collected from the 50 twenty-year 
simulations. In each hour each unit sells a quantity of energy, Q, at the spot price, p. Also, in 
each hour, each unit has an obligation QOB defined above. For any scarcity hour the hedge 
payment is HP = (Q – QOB) × (p – PS), and the energy rent is, ER = max(0, Q × (min(p, PS) – 
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VC)) where, PS is the scarcity price and VC is the unit’s variable cost which is determined only 
by its type and is constant throughout the simulation. For comparison with the no-hedge world 
we also need energy rents including PER (the energy rents above the scarcity price). These are 
given by ER+ = max(0, Q × (p – VC)). 
Given these values we compute profits as described above. The various components of 
profit are also tracked. 
 Profit = FE payment + Hedge payments + Energy rents – Fixed costs  
This allows risks to be compared between the three components. 
Scenarios 
We analyze the three scenarios shown in Table 7. The first is the benchmark scenario. The 
second doubles the slope of the firm energy demand curve. The third doubles the price elasticity 
of demand. In the high demand response case, a 10% increase in price causes a 1% drop in 
demand; in the benchmark, a 20% increase in prices causes a 1% drop in demand. In the steep 
FE demand curve case, the price moves from 2 CONE to 1/2 CONE as the firm energy quantity 
moves from 2% under target to 2% over target; in the benchmark, the same price movement 
requires deviations from the target of ±4%. 








1 Benchmark -0.05 4%
2 Steep FE demand curve -0.05 2%
3 High demand response -0.1 4%  
5.2 Simulation results 
We now present the results from the three scenarios. Since our focus is on long-run 
investment decisions, we only display yearly results. Hourly, daily, or even monthly variations 
are of little concern for a company deciding on investments that span multiple decades. 
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The first step is to construct the bid matrix, which gives the competitive bids for each unit 
type given the unit mix. The competitive bids are essentially the same across all three scenarios. 
The reason is that energy rents dominate the profit calculation, and energy rents are the same in 
all scenarios. Figure 14 shows the most profitable unit type given the resource mix. Only 
relevant points in the resource mix triangle are calculated; that is, mixes near the current mix and 
long-run equilibrium mix. When the hydro share is large, peakers are best; when the peaker share 
is large, hydro is best; when the peaker-hydro shares are near equilibrium, baseload is best. 
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Figure 15. New entry by year and unit type (benchmark) 













































































Sum of FE for each s im for Benchmark.  Color shows details about yearadded.  Size shows details  about unittype. The view is filtered on yearadded and unittype. The yearadded filter excludes 0. The unittype 
filter keeps B, H and P.  
Figure 15 shows the entry of units over the twenty years in each of the 50 benchmark 
simulations (covering 1000 years). The length of the bar indicates the unit’s firm energy; the 
width of the bar indicates the unit type (peaker, fat; hydro medium; baseload, thin). For example, 
in year 1 (light blue) of the first simulation, one small peaker was added and three baseload. The 
final baseload unit was quite large, resulting in a large excess supply of 10%. As a result of this 
large excess supply, there is no entry until year 5, when one hydro unit and one baseload unit are 
added. Such a large excess supply is unusual. The implication is one or more years of no entry in 
which the firm energy price is determined from the firm energy demand curve. 
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Figure 16. Number of new entries by year and unit type (benchmark) 































































































Count of FE for each s im broken down by yearadded for Benchmark.  Color shows details about unittype. The view is filtered on yearadded and unittype. The yearadded filter excludes 0. The unittype filter keeps B, H and P.  
Figure 16 shows the number of units of each type that are added in each year. On average 
there are 1.6 entries per year. A histogram of the number of entries per year is shown below.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
27% 29% 21% 12% 7% 3% 2%
Histogram of entries per year
 
In over one-half of the years (56%) there is either one entry or no entry. Roughly one-
quarter of the time, no entry will be needed and the firm energy price will be set by the demand 
curve. This is likely an overstatement, since we have assumed that new project size is random 
and grows with load. In practice, in years in which only a small amount of additional entry is 
needed, it is more likely that a smaller project that better fits the need will win the auction. 
Table 8. Firm energy and output shares by unit type 
Scenario:
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm energy shares
Baseload 1000 44% 5% 32% 58% 43% 5% 31% 53% 44% 5% 32% 58%
Hydro 1000 39% 3% 30% 48% 39% 3% 32% 49% 39% 3% 30% 48%
Peaker 1000 17% 2% 13% 21% 17% 2% 14% 21% 17% 2% 13% 21%
Output shares
Baseload 1000 34% 7% 11% 51% 34% 7% 11% 51% 34% 7% 11% 51%
Hydro 1000 65% 7% 47% 89% 65% 7% 47% 89% 65% 7% 47% 89%
Peaker 1000 1% 1% 0% 9% 1% 1% 0% 9% 1% 1% 0% 9%
Benchmark Steep FE demand curve High demand response
 
Table 8 shows statistics on the firm energy shares and the energy output shares for each 
scenario. The level of demand response does not impact these shares. The steeper firm energy 
demand curve changes the shares only slightly. The steeper demand curve alters some of the 
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decisions on whether to accept the last unit; buying less than the target becomes more expensive, 
so there is a greater tendency to purchase a bit extra. 














Mean firm energy 
supply
1 Benchmark 4% -0.05 57.04 80.5 423.76 9,868 10,027
2 Steep FE demand curve 2% -0.05 56.76 69.8 449.32 9,868 10,046
3 High demand response 4% -0.1 54.79 80.5 179.60 9,868 10,027  
Table 9 shows the mean values of a number of variables for the three simulations. The 
energy price is lowest in the high demand response case. The steep demand curve has a slightly 
lower mean energy price as a result of the tendency to buy a bit more firm energy with the 
steeper curve. Scarcity hours are rare—only about 80 hours per year in the benchmark case. 
Doubling the demand elasticity more than halves the energy price during scarcity hours. 
Figure 17. Excess supply and firm energy price in first 10 simulations 
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Sum of Excess Supply Percentage for each year broken down by s im vs. Case.  Color shows sum of Firm Energy Price. The view is filtered on s im and Case. The s im filter keeps 10 members. The Case filter keeps Benchmark and Steep FE 
demand.
 
Figure 7 shows the excess supply of firm energy acquired in the auction for the first 10 
twenty-year simulations. Darker bars indicate a higher firm energy price in the year. The excess 
supply does not depend on the demand elasticity, so only the two scenarios are shown. Surplus is 
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much more common than shortage, given the minimize total cost rule. Buying less than the target 
results in a high firm energy price. This is especially true with a steep firm energy demand curve, 
which is why shortages are fewer and smaller in this case. Excess supply is never more than 
10%. A large excess supply results in one or more years of surplus. In these surplus years, the 
firm energy price falls. This is a main source of variation in the firm energy price. 
Figure 18. Scarcity hours and scarcity price 
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Sum of Scarcity Hours for each year broken down by s im vs. Case.  Color shows average of Scarcity Price. The data is filtered on Scarcity Hours, which ranges from 1 to 2160. The view is filtered on Case, which keeps Benchmark and Steep 
FE demand.
 
Figure 18 shows the number of scarcity hours in each year of each simulation; darker bars 
indicate a higher average energy price in the scarcity hours. Since hydro tends to smooth the 
energy price over each hour of the month, the number of scarcity hours in a year tends to be 
some multiple of the number of hours in a month (about 720); that is, we tend to have “scarcity 
months.” Each year tends to have either 0, 1, 2, 3 scarcity months as shown in the histogram 
below. 
0 1 2 3
91.8% 5.4% 2.4% 0.4%




The vast majority of years have (92%) have no scarcity months. Over 1000 years, only 4 had 
3 scarcity months. There are only a few years where the energy price is exceptionally high. In 
these dry periods, demand response would likely be much larger than assumed, resulting in more 
reasonable prices. 
Figure 19. Firm energy price 
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Average of Firm Energy Price for each year broken down by sim vs. Case. The view is filtered on Case, which keeps Benchmark and Steep FE demand.  
Figure 19 shows the firm energy price in every year and simulation. The main source of 
variation is the drops that occur when there are multiple years of surplus as a result of a large 
new entry. The steepness of the firm energy demand curve does not have much of an impact; the 
reason is that the big drops are bumping into the floor at 1/2 CONE in both cases. The steeper 
slope results in only a 5% lower price overall. 
The adopted resolution eliminates this variation in the firm energy price in surplus years, 
since it sets the firm energy price equal to the price from the last successful auction. Load 
purchases the target quantity and the payment is allocated pro-rata among suppliers. The 




Figure 20. Energy price (annual mean) 
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Average of Energy Price for each year broken down by sim vs. Case.  
The average energy price is close to the baseload marginal cost in most years. The price 
jumps substantially higher in a very few of the 1000 years. Notice how sensitive the spikes are to 
the demand response.  
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Figure 21. Annual profit per MWh of firm energy 
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Sum of profit for each year broken down by s im vs. Case.  
Figure 21 displays the aggregate profits for every year and simulation. The variation in 
profits is largely attributable to the variation in energy rents. This also explains why the variation 
in profits is about the same in all scenarios. The variation comes from the variation in hydro 
output, which is roughly the same in all alternatives. Of course, long-term energy contracts 
would reduce this yearly-variation in profits, but not eliminate it. We are assuming no energy 
contracts in our analysis. 
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Table 10. Aggregate annual profits per MWh of firm energy 























4% -0.05 Mean 3.26 0.07 35.75 38.41 39.07 38.41 -0.72 -1.39
4% -0.05 Std. Dev. 0.44 0.39 3.84 20.71 4.06 20.71 2.91 20.49
4% -0.05 Min 1.66 0.00 25.63 25.63 29.30 25.63 -6.73 -9.68
4% -0.05 Median 3.36 0.00 35.59 35.67 38.77 35.67 -1.34 -4.61
4% -0.05 Max 3.94 5.33 48.24 320.22 53.73 320.22 11.81 278.21
2% -0.05 Mean 3.15 0.06 35.75 38.24 38.97 38.24 -0.92 -1.64
2% -0.05 Std. Dev. 0.54 0.38 3.79 20.12 4.02 20.12 2.83 19.93
2% -0.05 Min 1.66 0.00 27.48 27.48 30.10 27.48 -7.13 -9.69
2% -0.05 Median 3.32 0.00 35.53 35.59 38.65 35.59 -1.44 -4.68
2% -0.05 Max 3.84 5.33 48.24 320.22 53.73 320.22 11.87 278.21
4% -0.1 Mean 3.26 0.02 35.75 36.42 39.03 36.42 -0.77 -3.38
4% -0.1 Std. Dev. 0.44 0.10 3.84 6.19 3.98 6.19 2.80 5.53
4% -0.1 Min 1.66 0.00 25.63 25.63 29.30 25.63 -6.73 -9.68
4% -0.1 Median 3.36 0.00 35.59 35.67 38.77 35.67 -1.34 -4.61
4% -0.1 Max 3.94 1.01 48.24 99.72 52.51 99.72 11.42 59.16
With hedge
 
Table 10 shows statistics of the components of aggregate profit per MWh of firm energy for 
each scenario. The three components of profits are the first energy payment, the hedge payment 
(reflecting rewards for overperformance and penalties for underperformance), and the energy 
rent. These are given in the “With hedge” columns, which is the proposed market with the hedge 
at the scarcity price. Summing these three columns gives the profits before fixed costs under the 
proposal (i.e., with hedge). For comparison, the next column gives the energy rent plus the peak 
energy rent (profits from prices above the scarcity price), which would be relevant in a world 
without the mandatory hedge. The last two columns gives the profits after fixed costs, both under 
the proposal (with hedge) and in an energy-only world without the hedge and capacity payment. 
There are several things to note. 
• As mentioned earlier, the mean of the firm energy payment is not especially relevant, since it 
is easily increased by adding a constant to the assumed fixed cost of each resource. 
• The firm energy payment is nearly the same as the firm energy price, but it reflects the fact 
that the new entrants are locking in the price for ten years, whereas existing suppliers are 
receiving the annual price. 
• The aggregate hedge payment is always nonnegative. One might think that the aggregate 
hedge payment should be zero in every year: since the load is always satisfied, the rewards 
for overperformance should balance the penalties for underperformance. This is nearly the 
case. The reason there is a positive hedge payment in some years is that a resource’s 
obligation is capped in any given month by the amount of firm energy that the resource has 
sold. This cap limits the obligation for certain high-performing hydro resources, and thus 
makes the aggregate obligation less than the aggregate energy, resulting in a positive hedge 
payment.  
• The mean profits after fixed cost are slightly negative in all scenarios. One might expect the 
mean profits to be zero, since the bids were chosen so the firm makes zero profits in the long 
run. There are two reasons profits have a negative bias: 1) In the simulation to determine 
bids, lumpiness was not considered; it was assumed that the firm energy target was 
purchased each year. In fact, when there is a surplus energy rents are less and the firm energy 
price in the next year may be substantially less if the surplus is more than a year’s growth. 2) 
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The bids assume that the shares stay fixed forever. In fact, the shares drift around and tend to 
spend more time at levels that are less attractive than more attractive to the winning bidder. 
This subtle bias has to do with the fact that the clearing price is based on the lowest of the 
three bids. Real bidders would take these biases into account, adding them to their bids so 
that zero profits are attained. 
• Most interesting is the standard deviation in aggregate profits, which is a good measure of 
aggregate risk. In all scenarios, the standard deviation is less than $3. In contrast, in a world 
without the mandatory hedge, the standard deviation of profits would be an order of 
magnitude higher in the benchmark case, and double in the case with high demand response. 
This highlights the advantage of the market in reducing risk. Interestingly, the standard 
deviation of profits is even less than the standard deviation in energy rents. It is clear that the 
main source of risk is variation in energy rents from year to year. This risk can be mitigated 
somewhat through long-term energy contracts. 
• The steep firm energy demand curve changes little from the benchmark. Profits are slightly 
reduced, probably because the steeper demand curve makes the lumpiness bias a bit worse, 
since large lumps are more frequently accepted, even if only a small fraction of the lump is 
needed. 
• The high demand response results in essentially no change under the proposal. This is 
because the mandatory hedge makes the suppliers immune to large changes in prices above 
the scarcity price. These prices are important for performance incentives, but they do not 
have an aggregate impact on suppliers. This is an important virtue of the market: profits and 
risks do not depend critically on demand’s response to high prices. In contrast, in the no-
hedge world, profits and especially risks are heavily dependent on demand elasticity. 
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Figure 22. Annual profit by unit type (Benchmark, 20 simulations) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20











































Sum of profit for each year broken down by s im vs. unittype for Benchmark. The view is filtered on s im, which keeps 20 members.  
Figure 22 shows how profit varies by unit type. Only the first 20 simulations of the 
benchmark are shown here. In terms of risk, peakers are the least risky, hydro is second, and 
baseload is the most risky. Energy rents for baseload units are highly variable in the simulation, 
since the baseload units are often on the margin and so earn zero energy rents, or large when 
peaker or hydro is on the margin. Peakers earn little energy rents; almost all of a peaker’s 
revenue is coming from the firm energy payment. 
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Table 11. Annual profits per MWh of firm energy by unit type 























4% -0.05 Baseload Mean 3.27 0.00 4.06 7.04 7.33 7.04 -0.67 -0.96
4% -0.05 Baseload Std. Dev. 0.39 0.00 4.73 24.73 4.76 24.73 4.76 24.73
4% -0.05 Baseload Min 1.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.87 0.00 -6.13 -8.00
4% -0.05 Baseload Median 3.36 0.00 2.55 2.55 5.95 2.55 -2.05 -5.45
4% -0.05 Baseload Max 3.92 0.00 24.90 340.27 28.18 340.27 20.18 332.27
4% -0.05 Hydro Mean 3.26 0.17 86.29 88.48 89.72 88.48 -0.88 -2.12
4% -0.05 Hydro Std. Dev. 0.49 0.99 3.02 15.13 3.20 15.13 3.20 15.13
4% -0.05 Hydro Min 1.49 0.00 74.09 74.09 77.47 74.09 -13.13 -16.51
4% -0.05 Hydro Median 3.39 0.00 86.17 86.42 89.55 86.42 -1.05 -4.18
4% -0.05 Hydro Max 3.99 12.76 99.34 297.53 102.68 297.53 12.08 206.93
4% -0.05 Peaker Mean 3.23 0.00 0.18 3.16 3.42 3.16 -0.48 -0.74
4% -0.05 Peaker Std. Dev. 0.48 0.00 0.67 23.04 0.85 23.04 0.85 23.04
4% -0.05 Peaker Min 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.00 -2.30 -3.90
4% -0.05 Peaker Median 3.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.40 0.00 -0.50 -3.90
4% -0.05 Peaker Max 4.01 0.00 4.93 327.86 8.50 327.86 4.60 323.96
2% -0.05 Baseload Mean 3.17 0.00 3.98 6.76 7.15 6.76 -0.85 -1.24
2% -0.05 Baseload Std. Dev. 0.48 0.00 4.65 24.07 4.66 24.07 4.66 24.07
2% -0.05 Baseload Min 1.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.86 0.00 -6.14 -8.00
2% -0.05 Baseload Median 3.33 0.00 2.55 2.55 5.91 2.55 -2.09 -5.45
2% -0.05 Baseload Max 3.83 0.00 24.90 340.27 28.18 340.27 20.18 332.27
2% -0.05 Hydro Mean 3.14 0.15 86.18 88.21 89.48 88.21 -1.12 -2.39
2% -0.05 Hydro Std. Dev. 0.60 0.96 2.99 14.66 3.18 14.66 3.18 14.66
2% -0.05 Hydro Min 1.38 0.00 74.11 74.11 77.49 74.11 -13.11 -16.49
2% -0.05 Hydro Median 3.34 0.00 86.07 86.32 89.33 86.32 -1.27 -4.28
2% -0.05 Hydro Max 3.92 12.73 99.34 297.53 103.13 297.53 12.53 206.93
2% -0.05 Peaker Mean 3.11 0.00 0.16 2.94 3.27 2.94 -0.63 -0.96
2% -0.05 Peaker Std. Dev. 0.59 0.00 0.63 22.44 0.86 22.44 0.86 22.44
2% -0.05 Peaker Min 1.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.45 0.00 -2.45 -3.90
2% -0.05 Peaker Median 3.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.35 0.00 -0.55 -3.90
2% -0.05 Peaker Max 3.93 0.00 4.93 327.86 8.58 327.86 4.68 323.96
4% -0.1 Baseload Mean 3.27 0.00 4.06 4.79 7.33 4.79 -0.67 -3.21
4% -0.1 Baseload Std. Dev. 0.39 0.00 4.73 7.86 4.76 7.86 4.76 7.86
4% -0.1 Baseload Min 1.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.87 0.00 -6.13 -8.00
4% -0.1 Baseload Median 3.36 0.00 2.55 2.55 5.95 2.55 -2.05 -5.45
4% -0.1 Baseload Max 3.92 0.00 24.90 89.99 28.18 89.99 20.18 81.99
4% -0.1 Hydro Mean 3.26 0.05 86.29 86.86 89.60 86.86 -1.00 -3.74
4% -0.1 Hydro Std. Dev. 0.49 0.24 3.02 4.22 3.11 4.22 3.11 4.22
4% -0.1 Hydro Min 1.49 0.00 74.09 74.09 77.47 74.09 -13.13 -16.51
4% -0.1 Hydro Median 3.39 0.00 86.17 86.38 89.46 86.38 -1.14 -4.22
4% -0.1 Hydro Max 3.99 2.62 99.34 123.04 102.68 123.04 12.08 32.44
4% -0.1 Peaker Mean 3.23 0.00 0.18 0.92 3.42 0.92 -0.48 -2.98
4% -0.1 Peaker Std. Dev. 0.48 0.00 0.67 5.11 0.85 5.11 0.85 5.11
4% -0.1 Peaker Min 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.00 -2.30 -3.90
4% -0.1 Peaker Median 3.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.40 0.00 -0.50 -3.90
4% -0.1 Peaker Max 4.01 0.00 4.93 70.02 8.50 70.02 4.60 66.12
With hedge
 
Table 11 shows the components of profit per MWh of firm energy by unit type. Notice that 
the aggregate hedge payments for baseload and peaker are zero. This is because of our decision 
not to model outages of thermal units explicitly. Hence, there is no under or over performance. 
However, if we did model outages explicitly aggregate hedge payments would be nearly zero. 
Comparing the different unit types, we see that the negative bias in profits from lumpiness 
and competitive forces is greatest for hydro (-.88) and weakest for peaker (-.48). The reason is 
that hydro units are more dependent on energy rents for profits and therefore are more vulnerable 
to large lumps, which create surpluses and thus lower energy rents. 
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Figure 23. Annual profit by company (benchmark, 20 simulations) 
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Sum of profit for each year broken down by s im vs. ownerid for Benchmark. The view is filtered on sim, which keeps 20 members.  
Figure 23 shows the annual profits per MWh of firm energy by company for the first 20 
simulations (400 years). The profits in any year are dependent on the mix of resources that the 
company holds and the amount of hydro output that the firm has especially in dry periods. This is 
seen looking at the company with the greatest risk (company 6, based on AES Chivor) and the 
least risk (company 7, based on Termocandelaria). Company 6 starts with a single plant, a large 
hydro unit. Company 7 starts with two medium-size peakers and a tiny baseload unit. 
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Table 12. Annual profits per MWh of firm energy by company (benchmark) 



























4% -0.05 1 Mean 3.27 0.45 49.09 51.87 52.81 51.87 -0.91 -1.84
4% -0.05 1 Std. Dev. 0.42 4.66 9.79 24.19 11.38 24.19 6.80 22.30
4% -0.05 1 Min 1.58 -9.04 27.02 27.02 30.39 27.02 -14.73 -16.32
4% -0.05 1 Median 3.37 0.00 49.07 49.51 52.46 49.51 -1.94 -5.13
4% -0.05 1 Max 3.95 81.48 76.54 375.39 153.82 375.39 89.99 322.78
4% -0.05 2 Mean 3.28 -0.04 53.04 55.48 56.28 55.48 0.71 -0.09
4% -0.05 2 Std. Dev. 0.43 1.93 11.04 20.57 11.28 20.57 4.68 17.97
4% -0.05 2 Min 1.54 -34.76 27.79 27.79 15.59 27.79 -35.14 -13.05
4% -0.05 2 Median 3.38 0.00 52.91 53.66 56.32 53.66 0.35 -2.71
4% -0.05 2 Max 4.02 14.99 83.52 285.94 86.14 285.94 22.68 228.42
4% -0.05 3 Mean 3.25 -0.03 9.27 12.15 12.49 12.15 -0.62 -0.95
4% -0.05 3 Std. Dev. 0.46 0.98 9.02 24.77 9.05 24.77 3.94 23.53
4% -0.05 3 Min 1.49 -20.05 0.00 0.00 1.61 0.00 -16.51 -14.93
4% -0.05 3 Median 3.36 0.00 6.70 6.81 9.79 6.81 -1.33 -4.66
4% -0.05 3 Max 4.01 12.37 40.83 336.69 44.38 336.69 26.12 329.87
4% -0.05 4 Mean 3.25 -0.09 42.42 44.84 45.59 44.84 -4.42 -5.17
4% -0.05 4 Std. Dev. 0.47 1.87 9.60 20.08 9.81 20.08 4.89 17.96
4% -0.05 4 Min 1.49 -32.82 18.36 18.36 16.45 18.36 -37.68 -18.53
4% -0.05 4 Median 3.37 0.00 42.69 43.26 45.98 43.26 -4.69 -7.59
4% -0.05 4 Max 3.99 17.89 69.63 293.15 90.52 293.15 25.13 236.27
4% -0.05 5 Mean 3.23 0.17 11.66 14.73 15.06 14.73 2.28 1.95
4% -0.05 5 Std. Dev. 0.49 1.32 7.93 24.86 8.19 24.86 4.07 24.14
4% -0.05 5 Min 1.44 -0.37 2.15 2.15 5.27 2.15 -8.68 -12.28
4% -0.05 5 Median 3.34 0.00 9.21 9.23 12.49 9.23 1.79 -1.49
4% -0.05 5 Max 3.97 28.07 49.02 337.65 52.32 337.65 41.51 327.41
4% -0.05 6 Mean 3.24 -0.55 73.27 74.98 75.96 74.98 0.35 -0.63
4% -0.05 6 Std. Dev. 0.47 5.76 16.14 20.46 17.29 20.46 11.26 15.85
4% -0.05 6 Min 1.50 -108.03 27.71 27.71 -33.71 27.71 -110.64 -27.59
4% -0.05 6 Median 3.35 0.00 73.65 74.36 76.33 74.36 0.05 -2.84
4% -0.05 6 Max 3.99 33.60 119.51 279.32 133.44 279.32 42.84 202.39
4% -0.05 7 Mean 3.23 0.08 4.31 7.29 7.62 7.29 -0.56 -0.89
4% -0.05 7 Std. Dev. 0.52 1.44 9.76 25.37 10.19 25.37 3.09 23.18
4% -0.05 7 Min 1.44 -2.65 0.00 0.00 1.51 0.00 -17.47 -21.08
4% -0.05 7 Median 3.37 0.00 0.63 0.63 4.03 0.63 -0.79 -4.10
4% -0.05 7 Max 4.05 42.09 64.91 329.47 92.66 329.47 43.12 325.04
4% -0.05 8 Mean 3.22 0.00 6.02 8.96 9.23 8.96 -0.40 -0.67
4% -0.05 8 Std. Dev. 0.53 0.20 9.10 25.70 9.14 25.70 5.06 24.46
4% -0.05 8 Min 1.44 -4.65 0.00 0.00 1.51 0.00 -6.49 -9.83
4% -0.05 8 Median 3.36 0.00 3.55 3.55 6.42 3.55 -1.81 -5.45
4% -0.05 8 Max 4.05 3.22 62.26 340.27 67.42 340.27 35.76 332.27
4% -0.05 9 Mean 3.21 -0.01 5.61 8.56 8.81 8.56 -0.52 -0.76
4% -0.05 9 Std. Dev. 0.55 0.27 9.02 25.40 9.06 25.40 5.13 24.38
4% -0.05 9 Min 1.44 -8.37 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 -9.77 -13.51
4% -0.05 9 Median 3.34 0.00 2.26 2.26 5.99 2.26 -1.83 -5.28
4% -0.05 9 Max 4.05 0.95 63.86 338.87 67.23 338.87 41.86 331.33
4% -0.05 10 Mean 3.23 0.07 7.63 10.64 10.93 10.64 0.05 -0.24
4% -0.05 10 Std. Dev. 0.53 1.92 11.29 26.95 11.70 26.95 6.94 25.39
4% -0.05 10 Min 1.44 -0.59 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 -17.93 -20.87
4% -0.05 10 Median 3.36 0.00 4.57 4.57 7.53 4.57 -1.82 -5.36
4% -0.05 10 Max 4.05 60.36 76.55 339.54 106.03 339.54 79.28 331.78
With hedge
 
Table 12 shows the components of profits per MWh of firm energy by company in the 
benchmark scenario. Naturally, some firms make greater profits than others. The variation stems 
primarily from the variation in the quantity and timing of hydro output. Those companies that 
happen to have relatively greater hydro output when the energy price is higher do better, because 
they are able to capture higher energy rents and have a positive hedge payment. 
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The standard deviation of profits after fixed costs (with hedge) is an important statistic. 
Notice that it is under $7 for all companies, except company 6 ($11.26), which is an outlier. In 
all cases, the primary source of variation is the energy rent. Again, this variation can be mitigated 
with energy contracts, but significant variation will remain as a result of hydro output variance. 
Table 13. Annual profits per MWh of firm energy by company (steep FE demand curve) 



























2% -0.05 1 Mean 3.17 0.43 49.58 52.19 53.18 52.19 -1.19 -2.19
2% -0.05 1 Std. Dev. 0.52 4.65 9.95 23.80 11.50 23.80 6.77 21.84
2% -0.05 1 Min 1.46 -6.49 27.43 27.43 29.65 27.43 -15.12 -18.62
2% -0.05 1 Median 3.33 0.00 49.81 50.21 52.80 50.21 -2.12 -5.20
2% -0.05 1 Max 3.89 81.27 76.54 375.39 153.61 375.39 89.78 322.78
2% -0.05 2 Mean 3.17 -0.03 52.80 55.08 55.95 55.08 0.52 -0.34
2% -0.05 2 Std. Dev. 0.53 1.92 10.82 20.05 11.09 20.05 4.61 17.47
2% -0.05 2 Min 1.29 -34.67 27.79 27.79 15.73 27.79 -34.98 -12.75
2% -0.05 2 Median 3.34 0.00 52.65 53.24 55.97 53.24 0.21 -2.86
2% -0.05 2 Max 3.83 14.99 83.40 285.94 85.64 285.94 22.62 228.42
2% -0.05 3 Mean 3.14 -0.02 9.33 12.04 12.45 12.04 -0.63 -1.04
2% -0.05 3 Std. Dev. 0.56 0.98 9.26 24.23 9.31 24.23 3.93 22.93
2% -0.05 3 Min 1.46 -20.00 0.00 0.00 1.57 0.00 -16.51 -13.67
2% -0.05 3 Median 3.31 0.00 6.31 6.34 9.30 6.34 -1.36 -4.64
2% -0.05 3 Max 3.82 12.65 45.39 336.69 48.19 336.69 26.40 329.87
2% -0.05 4 Mean 3.14 -0.11 42.16 44.40 45.19 44.40 -4.71 -5.51
2% -0.05 4 Std. Dev. 0.57 1.77 8.96 19.14 9.09 19.14 4.74 17.33
2% -0.05 4 Min 1.47 -32.75 17.93 17.93 16.57 17.93 -37.98 -18.53
2% -0.05 4 Median 3.33 0.00 42.49 42.83 45.52 42.83 -4.85 -7.80
2% -0.05 4 Max 3.89 8.62 71.24 292.53 74.67 292.53 12.27 235.65
2% -0.05 5 Mean 3.12 0.16 12.08 14.95 15.36 14.95 2.15 1.74
2% -0.05 5 Std. Dev. 0.60 1.31 8.33 24.39 8.61 24.39 4.07 23.45
2% -0.05 5 Min 1.22 -0.37 2.15 2.15 5.25 2.15 -8.68 -12.28
2% -0.05 5 Median 3.31 0.00 9.21 9.22 12.38 9.22 1.61 -1.51
2% -0.05 5 Max 3.86 28.01 49.02 337.65 52.23 337.65 41.51 327.41
2% -0.05 6 Mean 3.12 -0.52 73.48 75.06 76.08 75.06 0.04 -0.97
2% -0.05 6 Std. Dev. 0.57 5.59 16.21 20.30 17.30 20.30 11.20 15.66
2% -0.05 6 Min 1.26 -107.75 29.57 29.57 -33.43 29.57 -110.36 -27.59
2% -0.05 6 Median 3.30 0.00 74.05 74.48 76.86 74.48 -0.40 -3.05
2% -0.05 6 Max 3.91 33.55 123.47 278.91 133.33 278.91 43.67 201.98
2% -0.05 7 Mean 3.11 0.04 4.10 6.87 7.25 6.87 -0.66 -1.03
2% -0.05 7 Std. Dev. 0.63 0.53 9.37 24.39 9.53 24.39 3.03 22.57
2% -0.05 7 Min 1.22 -2.72 0.00 0.00 1.36 0.00 -17.30 -20.90
2% -0.05 7 Median 3.32 0.00 0.63 0.63 3.92 0.63 -0.85 -4.11
2% -0.05 7 Max 3.93 12.85 63.69 329.47 67.33 329.47 18.62 325.04
2% -0.05 8 Mean 3.10 0.00 6.24 8.99 9.33 8.99 -0.59 -0.94
2% -0.05 8 Std. Dev. 0.64 0.21 9.33 25.11 9.38 25.11 4.93 23.78
2% -0.05 8 Min 1.22 -4.85 0.00 0.00 1.36 0.00 -8.53 -11.88
2% -0.05 8 Median 3.32 0.00 3.32 3.33 6.29 3.33 -1.84 -5.45
2% -0.05 8 Max 3.93 3.21 65.38 340.27 68.84 340.27 35.54 332.27
2% -0.05 9 Mean 3.09 -0.01 5.21 7.98 8.30 7.98 -0.86 -1.18
2% -0.05 9 Std. Dev. 0.66 0.28 8.28 24.55 8.33 24.55 4.30 23.58
2% -0.05 9 Min 1.22 -8.52 0.00 0.00 1.36 0.00 -12.12 -15.46
2% -0.05 9 Median 3.32 0.00 2.26 2.26 5.86 2.26 -1.87 -5.28
2% -0.05 9 Max 3.93 1.05 60.79 338.87 64.53 338.87 18.38 331.33
2% -0.05 10 Mean 3.10 0.07 7.47 10.29 10.64 10.29 -0.13 -0.49
2% -0.05 10 Std. Dev. 0.64 1.95 11.30 26.39 11.69 26.39 7.09 24.82
2% -0.05 10 Min 1.22 -1.64 0.00 0.00 1.36 0.00 -18.32 -20.69
2% -0.05 10 Median 3.32 0.00 4.56 4.56 7.12 4.56 -1.91 -5.36
2% -0.05 10 Max 3.93 61.46 76.55 339.54 107.11 339.54 80.37 331.78
With hedge
 
Table 13 shows profits by company with the steep firm energy demand curve. The results 
are nearly the same, company-by-company, as the benchmark. 
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Table 14. Annual profits per MWh of firm energy by company (high demand response) 



























4% -0.1 1 Mean 3.27 0.11 49.09 49.78 52.47 49.78 -1.25 -3.93
4% -0.1 1 Std. Dev. 0.42 0.94 9.79 11.23 10.05 11.23 4.33 6.63
4% -0.1 1 Min 1.58 -1.17 27.02 27.02 30.39 27.02 -14.73 -16.32
4% -0.1 1 Median 3.37 0.00 49.07 49.38 52.44 49.38 -1.93 -5.14
4% -0.1 1 Max 3.95 16.51 76.54 130.05 88.85 130.05 25.02 66.22
4% -0.1 2 Mean 3.28 0.00 53.04 53.67 56.32 53.67 0.75 -1.91
4% -0.1 2 Std. Dev. 0.43 0.41 11.04 11.63 11.09 11.63 4.16 5.56
4% -0.1 2 Min 1.54 -5.64 27.79 27.79 30.75 27.79 -9.46 -13.05
4% -0.1 2 Median 3.38 0.00 52.91 53.33 56.22 53.33 0.35 -2.83
4% -0.1 2 Max 4.02 3.79 83.52 96.27 86.14 96.27 15.97 49.61
4% -0.1 3 Mean 3.25 -0.01 9.27 9.98 12.51 9.98 -0.60 -3.13
4% -0.1 3 Std. Dev. 0.46 0.21 9.02 10.61 9.06 10.61 3.78 6.83
4% -0.1 3 Min 1.49 -3.81 0.00 0.00 1.61 0.00 -11.42 -14.93
4% -0.1 3 Median 3.36 0.00 6.70 6.77 9.81 6.77 -1.32 -4.66
4% -0.1 3 Max 4.01 2.62 40.83 84.22 44.38 84.22 15.91 77.40
4% -0.1 4 Mean 3.25 -0.02 42.42 43.04 45.66 43.04 -4.34 -6.97
4% -0.1 4 Std. Dev. 0.47 0.43 9.60 10.42 9.65 10.42 4.42 5.87
4% -0.1 4 Min 1.49 -5.83 18.36 18.36 22.08 18.36 -16.22 -18.53
4% -0.1 4 Median 3.37 0.00 42.69 43.06 46.06 43.06 -4.66 -7.63
4% -0.1 4 Max 3.99 4.74 69.63 102.82 77.37 102.82 14.03 45.94
4% -0.1 5 Mean 3.23 0.05 11.66 12.42 14.94 12.42 2.16 -0.36
4% -0.1 5 Std. Dev. 0.49 0.32 7.93 9.56 8.00 9.56 3.59 6.63
4% -0.1 5 Min 1.44 -0.13 2.15 2.15 5.27 2.15 -8.68 -12.28
4% -0.1 5 Median 3.34 0.00 9.21 9.22 12.49 9.22 1.79 -1.49
4% -0.1 5 Max 3.97 4.93 49.02 81.10 52.32 81.10 20.71 70.86
4% -0.1 6 Mean 3.24 -0.12 73.27 73.73 76.39 73.73 0.78 -1.88
4% -0.1 6 Std. Dev. 0.47 1.34 16.14 16.50 16.29 16.50 9.66 10.12
4% -0.1 6 Min 1.50 -22.49 27.71 27.71 31.35 27.71 -25.55 -27.59
4% -0.1 6 Median 3.35 0.00 73.65 74.10 76.67 74.10 0.17 -2.94
4% -0.1 6 Max 3.99 10.93 119.51 134.85 123.15 134.85 40.23 57.93
4% -0.1 7 Mean 3.23 0.02 4.31 5.05 7.56 5.05 -0.62 -3.13
4% -0.1 7 Std. Dev. 0.52 0.29 9.76 11.20 9.88 11.20 2.71 5.84
4% -0.1 7 Min 1.44 -0.97 0.00 0.00 1.51 0.00 -17.47 -21.08
4% -0.1 7 Median 3.37 0.00 0.63 0.63 4.03 0.63 -0.79 -4.11
4% -0.1 7 Max 4.05 7.51 64.91 83.51 68.59 83.51 19.24 68.18
4% -0.1 8 Mean 3.22 0.00 6.02 6.74 9.24 6.74 -0.40 -2.89
4% -0.1 8 Std. Dev. 0.53 0.08 9.10 11.05 9.14 11.05 5.06 7.98
4% -0.1 8 Min 1.44 -1.71 0.00 0.00 1.51 0.00 -6.49 -9.83
4% -0.1 8 Median 3.36 0.00 3.55 3.55 6.42 3.55 -1.81 -5.45
4% -0.1 8 Max 4.05 1.36 62.26 89.99 65.71 89.99 33.90 81.99
4% -0.1 9 Mean 3.21 0.00 5.61 6.34 8.82 6.34 -0.51 -2.99
4% -0.1 9 Std. Dev. 0.55 0.05 9.02 10.80 9.07 10.80 5.13 7.90
4% -0.1 9 Min 1.44 -1.47 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 -9.77 -13.51
4% -0.1 9 Median 3.34 0.00 2.26 2.26 5.99 2.26 -1.82 -5.28
4% -0.1 9 Max 4.05 0.36 63.86 87.73 67.23 87.73 41.68 80.20
4% -0.1 10 Mean 3.23 0.01 7.63 8.37 10.87 8.37 0.00 -2.50
4% -0.1 10 Std. Dev. 0.53 0.34 11.29 12.86 11.38 12.86 6.52 8.99
4% -0.1 10 Min 1.44 -0.29 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 -17.63 -20.97
4% -0.1 10 Median 3.36 0.00 4.57 4.57 7.53 4.57 -1.82 -5.36
4% -0.1 10 Max 4.05 10.37 76.55 91.53 80.02 91.53 42.41 81.06
With hedge
 
Table 14 shows the profits by company in the high demand response case. Here the standard 
deviation of profits is reduced from the benchmark case, as a result of reduced variation in the 
hedge payments. This benefit of greater demand response is not seen in the aggregate, because 
the aggregate hedge payment is nearly zero in each year. Greater demand response has a 
dramatic effect of reducing peak energy rents. As a result, companies face reduced performance 
risk from the mandatory hedge. Sensitivity of profit risk to demand elasticity is much reduced 




The simulation models presented here demonstrate the risk-reducing benefits of the 
proposed firm energy market. In the market, suppliers sell a hedge against high prices to load. 
The hedge reduces risk for both load and suppliers. Suppliers receive a higher firm energy 
payment for offering the hedge, and offering the hedge is not risky because the supplier has the 
physical generating assets to satisfy its obligation. 
In Models 1 and 2, we considered a variation of the original proposal, in which the 
obligation for thermal resources is effectively constant during scarcity hours. In this case, hydro 
is asked to do all the load following. We thought that this variation might further reduce 
performance risk, since it results in obligations that are more consistent with the physical 
dispatch of the system. Our analysis, however, showed that this was not the case. Risk was 
unchanged. However, the variation does have substantial merit in that it improves the 
performance of the energy spot market in dry periods by assuring that suppliers enter the spot 
market with a more balanced position. For this reason, we adopt the thermal-constant obligation 
in Model 3. 
A major advantage of the proposed firm energy market is that once load is hedged from high 
prices during dry periods, the energy market can rely more on market forces and less on 
rationing during dry periods—spot prices can be allowed to increase to reflect the true 
opportunity cost of hydro resources. This will of course increase supplier risk relative to the 
analysis in Models 1 and 2. However, an important countervailing force that will reduce supplier 
risk is that—faced with strong performance incentives—suppliers will operate plants and make 
investments, so as to limit the downside risk. Thus, it is difficult to predict whether supplier risk 
going forward will increase or decrease relative to the analysis of Models 1 and 2 presented here. 
Model 3, by analyzing investment incentives explicitly over 50 twenty-year simulations, was 
able to provide several additional insights, as well as further support the results from Models 1 
and 2. 
Model 3 helps illuminate the issues of lumpy investments. If new plant sizes are similar to 
the historical plant sizes, few new units will be added in each year. Indeed, in about one-quarter 
of the years no new entry will occur. In these years, the simulation set the firm energy price from 
the firm energy demand curve, typically at a price significantly less than the prior-year price. As 
a result, the firm energy price fluctuates more than is desirable. The adopted resolution addresses 
this problem by setting the price in surplus years equal to the price in the last successful auction. 
Most importantly, the mandatory hedge was shown to be remarkably successful in reducing 
risk. The hedge reduced company risk by a factor of 4.5 in the benchmark case. From this, we 
can see that a higher scarcity price would increase risk. Increasing the scarcity price shifts the 
profit distribution toward the no hedge case—a scarcity price of infinity. This results in a large 
increase in energy rent risk and a small decrease in hedge payment risk. The overall impact is a 
large increase in profit risk. 
One important assumption of Model 3 is competitive entry. If instead there are substantial 
barriers to entry, then the market can be expected to perform less well. In particular, firm energy 
prices would rise above competitive levels. For the market to work well, it will be important for 
regulators to reduce entry barriers to the extent possible. 
